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Intelligence operations should be integrated with the overall operational planning for the campaign. A staff composed of officers of the appropriate divisions of the Army (and Navy, if involved) and of OCS should draw up general intelligence plans with specific attention to all features regarding it. The staff should be making communications efforts of CIB and the forces involved.

A. Planning

- A. Planning
- B. Mobilization
- C. Training
- D. Operations

Involves four factors:

The solution to the problem of providing such a service

II. DISCUSSION

The problem involved in the development of a system of intelligence operations in which the forces involved in a campaign would be adequately supplied, in the planning phase, with complete and detailed strategic information; during the initial assault with cooperative tactical information; and, throughout the subsequent phases, with a thorough coverage of both types. The overall objectives should be the continuity of flow of accurate and timely intelligence.

I. PROBLEM

SUBJECT: Suggested Outline for Coordinated Intelligence Operations before, during, and subsequent to the initial assault of a sustained campaign in occupied territory.

Dr. Henry Thompson

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Specifically the staff should:

1. Under the supervision of Strategic Intelligence that is looking for the military operations completed, and have it listed with indicators of progress.
2. Make a survey of possibilities for intelligence operations of all types, utilizing undercover networks, wireless of the type of Russian, Japanese, Italian, Soviet etc., and Field Observations. (See Annex I).
3. Determine the most effective time and cooperation of Machine and Field Observations, taking into consideration the many variations which may be occasioned by the enlargement of differing problems and situations.
4. Estimate the totals of officers, enlisted men, agents and interpreters that will be needed to carry out all operations, and provide sufficient replacements, and the qualifications and experience required, and require 1/1's and 1/2's to be drawn up in accordance therewith.
5. Estimate total of locals to be used as advantageous to results in the field for the local (Combat) Intelligence, interpreting, and other work, and forward the equipment and financing of them.
6. Design a combined communications system which will utilize the facilities and personnel of the Army and will involve direct communication by personnel stations with specific Army units.

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1. Training should be given in:

of use.

Old training has made a great deal of progress since the beginning in early 1942, but the following suggestions may be to be set up overseas.

the United States, it follows that training schools must continue since recruitment cannot be completely solved within

0. Training.

should be enough interpreters to provide one for each Lane Company. the recruitment of reliable and intelligent interpreters. In addition, special attention should be directed toward or sabotage operations.

4. Experience in intelligence work, reconnaissance,
3. Knowledge of language and country.
2. W/T or other communications experience.

condition.

1. Integrity, intelligence, courage and good physical qualifications for acceptance would be, in order of importance. overseas should be envisaged. In general, as heretofore, the being filled in the U.S. alone, home, large-scale recruiting It is unlikely that the I/O's can ever approximate

2. Recruitment.

recruitment of remaining personnel.

personnel to enter the I/O's and set up machinery for the 7. Request the assignment by old branches of capable

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Operations should be considered in three separate phases:

I. General.

etc.

at (T)ing (T)ing; i.e., at base, underway, under control conditions.

2. Generally, should be broken down and reviewed in the

of paper found in many countries is possibly of value.

emphasized; no student should be able to forget that every enemy

7. The importance of enemy documents should be repeatedly

should be employed previously.

good reporting and progress to specific results. Recommendations

The course should start with simple fundamentals of

(See Annex IX).

VIETNAM PLAN and later, "Linda" Plan, by the HUNGARIAN Mission.

after the picture of that used from (T)ing in connection with the

6. A "correspondence school" course should be developed

necessary.

employed to the extent that new schools may be needed as

5. A reserve of training equipment weapons should be con-

or safe return to base.

renewal from (T)ing by purchase or 7/7 base to ensure

relation of one week to (T)ing in the form of an enemy document

and killed. A final "summit" might be conducted in which a group

they should know what is to be done, executed, executed,

and military police, the O.I.O., and, in the United States, the

to (T)ing (T)ing for agents going undercover involving the local

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and not sponsored exclusively by any one branch. Intelligence
inter-dependence. There should all be combined operations
between the Field Detachments, on a basis of
3. Early in this phase should be developed the

goal of intelligent action.
Investigation and direction to progress over toward the
roads, and the bending of all effort on reaching objectives
whereas at all important junctions and observe on vital
the needs of our intelligence vision; the placing of plans
in strategic points, in accordance with priority, to place
2. Planning should involve the locating of agents

of useful strategic information.
creation of an intelligence network and the start of a flow
Thus, there would be no time lapse between the physical
component mentioned in item 1, para. 1, Sect. A-Planning.
should have in hand a questionnaire developed from the
of intelligence agents within enemy territory. The AI Chief
somed, from which to begin building systematically network
adequate bases, manned with capable and experienced per-
set up in our own, Allied, or neutral adjacent territory
1. If they do not already exist, there should be

1. Planning.

on this hinges the success of the two following phases:
Of these the planning phase is of paramount importance since,

- I. Planning.
- II. Assembly.
- XII. Subsequent Campaigns.

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Special Operations, CounterEspionage and Psychological Warfare go hand in glove and all are dependent upon communications.

4. The Penetration Missions should have a common Rear Base, (or bases, if need be) and should be composed of a Forward and a Rear Battalion, the latter to become, at a designated time, an integral part of the Field Detachment of the Army unit which will ultimately contact the Forward Battalion.

5. The bases of operation of the Forward Battalions of the Penetration Missions should be determined by the specific objectives of the entire campaign and signal plans should be developed in accordance with item 6, para. 1, Sect. A-Planning.

6. Forward Battalions should after arrival at operational base:

a. Establish W/T contact with Rear Base.
(Later, when indicated by Rear Base, contact would be made directly with Rear Battalion through Army communications facilities).

b. Set up L/D's, dead or alive, to facilitate communications of existing intelligence within the region, if any, and dead L/D's for D-Day.

c. Develop new channels, complementarily utilizing personnel, instructions and the "Correspondence School" course.

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and interpreters at Company OP's.

to intelligence teams with requirements and recommendations which
provide personnel and replacements for all levels from Army BN's

6. The Field Detachments should be of sufficient size to

four days.

7. Maintain contact with Forward Detachment through

with with dates and signal plans for overloading Forward Detachment.

8. Acquire communications officers of the Army

it might proper channels.

would report for orders to the O/I of the Detachment, but would,

as it were necessary to join the Field Detachment, after which to

departure of the Forward Detachment, serve the latter with such items

7. The Forward Detachment would serve with, or, in case of order

8. Prepare possibilities for NO operations.

plans.

9. Reports include sabotage personnel and parties

points and counsel equipment at or near these points.

or personnel communication during assault, select weapons

10. Choose personnel for S-Phone, Radio-Phone,

Review.

11. Set up bases for Forward and Air Play-up

Detachment.

Intelligence personnel for subsequent use by Field

12. Acquire weapons, radios, and equipment

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not be used).

Field Detachment. (However, the same has been done with

resisted conventional fields through to the surrounding

3. But, as soon as possible, they previously

4. Have as P/O's for military and/or naval service

and disposition of enemy forces.

5. Inform attending forces of last minute strength

maintain contact per plan. They would:

and observe would take their positions and would also and

6. B-Three, B-Five, B-Six, and American operations

maintain contact V/T contact with designated key units.

7. As a signal from New York, which to and

8. Forward Nelson would:

IX. Summary.

paragraphs and notes).

convention with this work, can should prepare illustrated

after capture, and various intelligence fundamentals. (In

many documents, the value of intelligence P/O's is limited by

officers and enlisted men in security, the importance of

9. Some every opportunity to introduce further

and attempt to build mutual confidence and teamwork.

10. All the (1-2's and 3-4's in every way possible.

addition to their obvious functions they should:

They should join their units well in advance of D-Day. In

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1. Arrangements for lateral dissemination at regional level of selected

his usual duties should:

- D. The Intelligence Officer of each Field Detachment, in addition to of their intimate and possessing reliable information from the work.
- be not as the Agency advised; not being released as they return the region
- C. A rotating system of active reconnaissance personnel would be used
- 3. Reconnaissance and tracking out of road-blocks.

2. Avoidance of enemy ambush.

ambush and raids on C's and M's.

3. The taking of specially desired personnel and documents through

among these possibilities would be:

- and in F/O from Divisional Artillery, supported by two heavy tanks.
- Many possibilities are open to a team composed of a battle patrol, Kohlen, should cooperate closely with them.
- (Mechanized), reinforced by the Tank Battalion, results of the forward reconnaissance) Plans and others known as battle patrol and the Field
- B. The Army has indicated with interest in I and II (Intelligence and and when it is over to be carried into the Field Detachment.
- A. The longer the forward Kohlen can remain forward, the better. If

III. ~~Intelligence~~

3. Intelligence activities of counter-espionage and radio for wire.

2. Also physical contact with forward Kohlen.

Intelligence.

- 1. Locate and I/O's for latest documentary and photographic
- B. Field Detachment would, in addition to normal F/D activities would and continue functioning if not, the law will overrule.
- 4. Full back, if possible, to remain behind the enemy's lines

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Major B. Smith, Jr.
Lt. Col. Inf.

Signed:

Final document.

2. Proper steps be taken to put into effect the suggestions of the

Planning Group.

representatives of all OSM branches who might be interested and to the
1. This outline be submitted for study and amendment to experienced

In consequence of the foregoing it is respectfully recommended that

IV. RECOMMENDATION

as a working basis for further campaigns.

Therefore, it would seem a reasonable conclusion that they could be adopted

tried basically, in a greater or smaller degree, and have proved feasible.

the suggestions above are not theory, without exception, each one has been

for their liberation and those of arms and the Philippines. In any case,

action between the natives of Europe who struggle, and are struggling,

itself seems borne out to some extent by the rough similarity of re-

territory which has been occupied by an aggressor power. The present

fundamentals of intelligence will apply in operations conducted in a

The above discussion has been founded on the premise that certain

III. CONCLUSION

importance of security and of documents.

3. Emphasize understanding to OSM, Army, and native personnel the

level.

2. Supervise the work of interpreters at battalion and company

intelligence obtained by OSM units.

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/s/ C. B. PETERS
Captain, USMC
Plans Officer

d. Place the facilities at the disposal of all intelligence agencies connected with PFI, and dispatch two radio operators to those points which, in the opinion of the commanding officer, best will serve to develop inter-Allied communications.

e. Establish letter boxes and other communications facilities with OLS and/or other points.

(4) Receive from all London, and communicate to the agents in the field, specific intelligence directives emanating from the staff and/or other commands.

(3) Receive couriers to establish contact with Moscow and KHA letter drops.

(2) Receive experienced radio and telegraph operators, and instruct them in the use of PFI, and thereafter dispatch them to procure information from geographical areas previously not covered by our espionage system.

(1) Process intelligence material.

b. Set up an operational and training center which will:

a. Establish a radio control and contact with Moscow.

the following functions:

2. To accomplish the objective stated above, it is proposed to establish an office at the headquarters of the PFI in the Moscow-Leningrad. The members of the mission will be attached to the PFI staff. They will perform the flow of secret intelligence from eastern and northern Russia and Germany to the Allied High Command and other approved commands, and to serve as a medium of direct communication with OLS established in Switzerland.

Subject: The Moscow Mission, Request for approval of:

From: Captain C. B. Peters

To: Colonel John Mackall

ALICE I

22 August 1944

RECOMMENDED

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28 Sept 1944

Subject: Report: Mission Atolls

I. PURPOSE OF MISSION ATOLLS.

1. To establish five combat intelligence stations on the line Carcassonne, Masseret, Millau, South Eastern edge Massif Central in order to:
 - (a) Advise G-2, 7th Army, Deuxieme Bureau Armees B, of enemy activity and emplacements, in the event of the establishment of an enemy line of defense on the above stated line.
 - (b) To signal the existence and movements of German units and columns; the locations of air-fields and munitions dumps, railroad and road activity in the event of enemy evacuation of South Western France.
 - (c) To establish liaison with the FFI to facilitate (a) and (b) by:
 1. Employing FFI as intelligence agents.
 2. Employing FFI as security patrols for the five CP's.
 3. Supplying the FFI with the necessary equipment to accomplish the above mentioned purposes.



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14.170
Field Report
Booth W.B.

Lt. W. T. M. Beale

Lt. Col. W. B. Booth Jr.

12 January 1948

Field Report

1. Attached is a copy of my report of the MANGEL (PROUST) Mission, together with annexes, which gives an outline of my activities from September to November 1944.
2. From May 1944 until September I was in England at Area B, serving as C.O. of the PROUST project. PROUST was an offshoot of the SUMSEX plan and had the same objective; the training and preparation of Frenchmen for introduction into France as agents.
3. My activities prior to this period, namely, from December 1941, have been fully documented in the files.

Signed:

W. B. Booth Jr.

Lt. Col., Inf.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: COLONEL JOHN P. DUFFY.

25 July, 1944.

1. When I was operating the Madama Tiasion from Spain, it developed that from the point of view of efficient organization and effect upon the morale of French agents, it was desirable to introduce some American officers into the "Equipe" to work with them. A plan was drawn up and submitted to Washington, but nothing was heard from them.

2. Information subsequently received would indicate that if the idea had been carried out, OSS would be much further advanced in its overall "Y" coverage of France than it is at present.

3. On the 17 July I presented to you a suggestion for the future utilization of the "roust" plan. Since that date, thought, study, and some research have amplified, in my own mind, my original idea and I have presented you another suggestion which embodies certain features of the old plus additional items which, in my opinion, offer very great possibilities.

4. The conclusions that I have reached are based upon my own experience, both as agent and operator, as well as that of others and entails my best judgment as to what should be done in general and as to how it, personally, can contribute most to the war effort.

5. I realize that at the moment you are entirely opposed to my going into the "Equipe", but I hope that you will change your mind. The reason for your opposition I believe is based on the old axiom that an intelligence officer should not run the risk of being captured.

6. I sincerely believe that I have no specific information to give to the enemy which could appreciably affect our military or intelligence operations, and the possibilities of developing a service beyond anything previously contemplated in this theatre, seem to me to outweigh by far the risks involved.

7. As I move into the SI Branch, and thereby to "roust", of my own choice and because of confidence in you based on your record, I hope that you will be able to reciprocate that confidence and give the matter your backing.

W.B. DUFFY, Jr.,
Lt. Col., INF.
CG Area "B".

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None of these was a radio operator and, consequently, there was no plan of escape with Victor. Due to the error in the manifest, a container with radio equipment had been loaded into the plane which arrived, and Command, who had some radio training, sent some messages blind for retransmission, but, apparently, these were not picked up.

Lt. Charnock

Lt. E. M. Burke

Lt. E. M. Burke

Colonel Booth

Lt. Colonel Booth

The half of the Mission which arrived at the destination consisted of

dropped neither passengers nor equipment.

plane was unable to find the landing field and returned to England, having result, was incorrect. This was most unfortunate, inasmuch as the pilot of one of the planes had been partially obliterated in the handling and the manifest, as a personnel in accordance with the manifest. Some of the numbers on the manifest in supervision, and as a consequence, before departure, it was necessary to recheck the containers of the Mission had been loaded into the planes without

on the 6th of September with the Maquis of Contraband as destination. It was greatly delayed in getting away, but finally left Harrington Airfield

1/4 Ralph Birdall (Chief Radio Operator)

and Lt. Dagher

and Lt. Dagher

and Lt. Dagher

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OPTION OF THE UNITED STATES
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340

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Thus the Mission got off to a bad start, lacking communication with base as well as half of the personnel and supplies. To add to the difficulties, Chmard had injured his knee in landing and, for several days, was able to walk only with the greatest effort.

The night of arrival was spent in the village of Comfresourt's hut, the following morning the Germans occupied the village, forcing the Mission to take up Bie. In the woods, where it was to remain until overrun by Allied Forces. As these woods were completely surrounded by the enemy, who attacked three times, it seemed the last straw in the way of obstacles to the achievement of the primary objective of the Mission. But the opportunities proved greater than the handicaps.

The Magde of Comfresourt had been recently strengthened by the acquisition of a Battalion of Ukrainians. They, under the leadership of two French officers, Captain Simon Dollion and Lt. Claude Voegman, who subsequently joined the Mareel Mission, had killed their German officers and NCOs and deserted to the Magdeards with all of their equipment. This, in addition to affording a measure of security to the Magde, and, therefore to the operations of the Mission, suggested the possibilities of riding and unloading and, hence, the taking of prisoners, which was one of the most lucrative sources of information. All prisoners were brought before the Mission for questioning immediately. Lt. Rumuk, who spoke Russian and was brought along expressly for that purpose, was attached to the Battalion as Liaison Officer and interpreter.

In the Magde, as the sponsors of Mareel had believed, valuable intelligence was lying about like ripe fruit fallen in a wild orchard. It merely remained for the Mission to pick it up, assort it, put it in the proper baskets, and deliver it. The Magde had its intelligence officer, and he had organized a chain of agents, but, his interest had not extended beyond information that was of immediate value to the Magde. Both his commanding officer and he were delighted to put all of their facilities at the disposal of the Mission, and these were considerable. The wire-filmed Correspondence Course on the Magde (See Annex III). New agents and couriers were recruited, and in two days' time, important OB and other Military Information was being sent through the enemy's lines to the Allied Forces, as well as warnings regarding the Ukrainians who were in German uniforms.

It was a happy arrangement for both parties. The men of the Magde were pleased and flattered at the recognition that the presence of the Mission implied and the effect upon their morale, and that of the surrounding towns, was considerable; further, the automatic weapons brought along by the Mission represented an appreciable increase in firepower. In turn, the Mission was more than gratified at the opportunities that offered for the procurement of intelligence and at the extremely satisfactory cooperation received on all sides. The facilities for efficient operation were very limited and the Magde was shortly overrun, but the experience and results obtained showed the possibilities of such a Mission as Mareel was originally intended to be.

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From all sources we developed a large and regular flow of intelligence which increased until about the 10th of October, after which time security measures of the Germans, coupled with Mexican counterintelligence, made the work increasingly difficult. Captain Dillion was killed, Lt. Degroot wounded, and Lt. Deane was forced to take sick leave. Also Lt. Harrel, who had been assigned to the Headquarters of the 1st Cavalry Division, was hospitalized and by a slight of hand. However, the work continued and is still going on, though the methods of operations had to be changed. For instance, though the damage eventually made access to some practically impossible to agents, it was feasible to set up a system of road-watching. Also possible was the thorough penetration of German positions in the Forest of Humboldt prior to the November attack by the 4th Division. Always, just when it seemed the work was stopped, something would turn up. After December had been completed it was more agents could be gotten in, French officers about the way to the Mexican with exact and detailed information regarding the defenses, objectives, and change objectives of that side. He had been parachuted into France in July and had been working in Germany since the 15th of August.

The identity of the Headquarters Squadron, and names of the members, was north from Comptonville to Hymel, then northeast to the Panamint center, and thence north to Humboldt, where the Squadron's command post was located on the 15th of October, on which date Lt. Colonel Booth left the Mexican.

During his absence occurred the first enemy attack, one of the heaviest being killed by his fire. After returning the squadron, Colonel Booth, as officers from duty, placed the Mission under the overall command of Colonel Smith, (88 Chief with the 1st Army, and Thompson had the complete cooperation of the 1st Officer and Lieutenant, and his staff. Shortly thereafter, Pvt. Smith, who knows German well and has training in personnel interrogation, was made available by Major Gosselin, and the Mission was set up to operate reasonably effectively. The greatest lack was of a trained intelligence officer.

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WALTER B. BOOTH, JR.
Lt. Colonel, Inf.
Commanding Officer, KANAKU Mission

Lt. Doughan was recalled by the French Army to command a company of the Ukrainian Battalion which is now to fight with the French. Lt. Doughan was released from duty, and Lt. Doughan was ordered back to the BOIA by Colonel Booth. Captain Winthrop Hetherford was assigned by Colonel Booth to replace Colonel Booth, and joined the Mission on the 24th of October. Colonel Booth left on the 21st.

Colonel Booth asked Colonel Booth for suggestions for improvement of intelligence operations in the field, and these are reported together with excerpts from the statements of Captain Dillion and Lt. Doughan. (Annexes I, II, and IV)

On the plus side was the thorough cooperation of Lt. Colonel Dodge and the officers of the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron. They put every available facility at the disposal of the Mission. The squadron furnished part of the Mission's transport and performed all the work of the coding and transmission of messages. Also enlisted personnel was assigned to aid in clerical work and to serve as drivers. No request made by the Mission to the squadron for assistance in carrying out the former's work was denied. If it were physically possible to provide.

One of the greatest tasks along the front was training French speaking personnel for security work. The 187th Infantry requested two of the French officers for this type of task, and they were assigned, thus meeting the scope of intelligence work and serving a very useful security function. At the end, the OIC was utilizing the Mission in their work and undoubtedly, henceforth, the largest part of the job for the Mission will be on the security end of things.

An example is that of the 187th Infantry Regiment which was stationed along side of the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron at Mamboury. The 5-2 of the 187th requested information from French on a certain tactical situation. This was given. Then the Colonel of the 187th requested that the Regiment be put on the front dismountation line. Later the back reports of French were requested. Colonel Booth saw Colonel O'Brien, commanding the 187th, and asked him the reason for his request, inasmuch as French reports were going to the O-2 of the Division. The Colonel replied that when the information of the type that French was affording, came back to them from the Division, it was days late, and sometimes it was not received at all. Subsequently, the Mission was able to supply urgently needed information and make before attacks carried out by the 187th and 180th Infantry Regiments, the 24th Engineer Regiment, and the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron.

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W. R. BROWN, JR.
Lt. Colonel, Inf.
OO, Foreign Mission

1. Prior to campaign, some of the intelligence personnel should be sent ahead to organize system of continuing contact and communication with existing chains and to recruit contacts and reconnaissance personnel to accompany Army.
2. Plans should be set up prior to departure of above personnel for direct communication with individual Army units destined for localities involved.
3. Trained Intelligence Officers should be assigned to each Regiment prior to invasion. These officers should preferably be nationals of the country to be invaded but, in any case, must have a complete mastery of the language and knowledge of the country.
4. Interpreter-Intelligence should be assigned to each Battalion.
5. It has been found that tactical intelligence, gathered from agents and reconnaissance personnel mentioned in Paragraph 1, has been disseminated too slowly to front-line units. The Intelligence Officers suggested in Paragraph 2 should disseminate information internally to each other.
6. The reconnaissance personnel mentioned in Paragraph 1 should be drilled in the importance of securing documents, both from personnel and from OPs as well as in material left behind in all zones of contact.
7. The location of security should be kept constantly in mind by all intelligence personnel and passed to all and every.
8. Prior to campaign, notes should be made for OP's liaison.
9. After the campaign is under way, intelligence and reconnaissance personnel should serve as liaison and security agents, cooperating with OPs.

TO : Colonel M. Dumble

SUBJECT: Suggestions for Improvement of Intelligence Operations in the Field.

NO October 1944

MAJOR W. R. BROWN, JR., 11TH CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON

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ANNEX II

In the Field
1st October 1966

SUBJECT: Co-ordination of Intelligence and Action.

TO : Lt. Colonel Hodge

1. On September 29th, on the basis of a PROUST report, a detail, consisting of a Battle Patrol from the 7th Inf., and an FO from the 68th FA, was sent to clear the enemy from RIMHNEY and the surrounding valley. I placed the services of the PROUST Reconnaissance Officers and the Commando at the disposal of the Lt. commanding and accompanied the detail as an observer.

2. The Operation developed that the Intelligence regarding the strength and disposition of the enemy was accurate but the result was, at best, a half-hearted success. The enemy was cleared from the village itself by 2230, at which time the patrol retired, leaving him free to return if he wished.

3. Failure to obtain better results, I believe, was due to the following factors:

a) Delay - By the time the detail finally got started, it was 1720 and the first shell did not fall upon the valley until 1830, which left less than an hour of daylight.

b) Lack of Co-ordination - There was no means of communication between the Patrol and the FO and there was no plan of action arranged between the Lt. commanding the patrol and the FO.

c) Lack of confidence in PROUST - Captain Simon and Lt. Neente, knowing their Intelligence to be correct, took an MG position and the gun and went on to capture a house which the enemy was defending with some ten men. The two PROUST officers had to wait an hour before the Patrol came up to support them.

Further, the Lt. in command of the Patrol did not use the Commando after arriving at the Valley, although they had spent the entire day there in reconnaissance.

4. In view of the foregoing, I recommend that in future, when similar situations develop, the specific exigencies be assessed by the Troop Commanders and definite action called for by them, embodying the proper utilisation of Intelligence, the Time Factor, number, composition, and disposition of the effectives, and communications.

W. B. MOORE, JR.
Lt. Colonel, Inf.
OO Proust (Marcel)

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On the 28th of August 1944, the Germans attacked the Nazis with a force composed of 2 Tiger Tanks, several armored cars, mobile machine guns and a force of seven or eight hundred men. On this occasion the Ukrainian Major demonstrated his lack of military ability and only the timely intervention of Captain Dillion and Lt. Vaughan saved the Ukrainian forces.

The Battalion joined the Nazis forces at Guntersdorf. The Ukrainian unit was composed of approximately 800 officers and their material, consisting of four AT guns, ten flame throwers, eighteen flame throwers, twelve heavy machine guns, 187 horses, 118 horse-drawn vehicles, and great stores of munitions.

On the 28th of August 1944, Captain Dillion learned that a Battalion of Ukrainians, with a cadre of German SS Officers and men, had arrived in Hungary from the Russian Front. These men had been pressed into service by the Nazis and brought to France to combat the Nazis. Captain Dillion immediately contacted the Ukrainian Major, and operating under the very nose of the SS men, he persuaded the Major that the Nazis were not the terrorists that the Germans had pleased them, but rather, fighting, as the Ukrainians had fought before the war of the SS men and the conversion of the Battalion to the French Forces. It was then this desertion, Captain Dillion, assisted by Lt. Vaughan, arranged a meeting with the Ukrainian Major. In the seven days preceding the desertion, Captain Dillion risked his life again and again to slip into the town and between the meetings with the Ukrainian Major. At 1030 hours, 27 August 1944, Captain Dillion made an appointment with the Ukrainian Major. At a signal from the French Officer, who came out of hiding at exactly 1030 hours, the Ukrainian forces, augmented and led by Lt. Vaughan, attacked and destroyed the entire SS force of 117 officers and non-commissioned officers.

After the surrender of France and its occupation by the Germans, Captain Dillion, who had been a member of the French Army, became very active in the resistance movement. From that time until the invasion of southern France, Captain Dillion was a fugitive from the invaders. He refused to leave France and seek safety in other countries even though he was both a fugitive and under suspicion for four years. In the service of his country, and the Allies, he was willing, giving his all in the eternal war against oppression and for the preservation of his country's rights. Throughout the darkest periods of his country's history, Captain Dillion struck numerous blows to aid the allied cause. In his unending war against the enemy, Captain Dillion organized Nazis, helped prisoners to escape, aided in the repatriation of American and British soldiers, stored and transported arms and supplies furnished to the resistance elements, sabotaged railways, troop-trains, enemy supply dumps and material, and in general was one of the leading elements in the internal war against the German troops of occupation.

Captain SIMON DILLON


Lt. Lt. CLAUDE VODGON.

Excerpts from the recommendations for award for Captain SIMON DILLON and

ANNEX IV

SECRET

ANNEX III



LEON

SECRET

the gun. Without waiting for the patrol to come up with them, Captain Dillion and Lt. Hedges advanced to the village, captured the first house and forced the enemy to retreat from the vicinity. It was later determined (from the effects found in the house) that the enemy occupants had numbered at least ten. The two officers occupied the house for an hour before the arrival of the battle patrol.

Throughout his association with Troop B, which lasted until his death in a subsequent action, Captain Dillion was a constant source of inspiration to all the men with whom he came in contact. On one occasion, Captain Dillion became sick and it was necessary for the Commanding Officer of Troop B to order him to bed. Captain Dillion obeyed the order only under strong protest, as he wished to join a patrol that was then leaving the area.

1st Lt. CLAUDE WOODSON

From the time of the surrender and the abundant cooperation of the French Resistance Movement were found by Patriote Resistance to fight against the invaders. Lt. Woodson, a member of the French Army until it was dismantled, was always in the forefront of the fight for freedom. A vigorous man and a hard fighter, it was not long before he was known and feared by the Germans. For the eighteen months previous to the invasion of Southern France, Lt. Woodson was hunted by the Germans. A reward of 100,000 francs was offered for his arrest or death by the enemy. He aided Captain Dillion with the Ukrainian Battalion as described in paragraph 2 of Captain Dillion's recommendation.

On the 17th of September 1944, Lt. Woodson, along with Captain Dillion and other members of the Front (Marcel) Battalion, was attached to the 11th Cavalry Regimental Squadron (Recon). Lt. Woodson was detailed to assist Troop A of the 11th Cavalry. During the time that he was attached to Troop A, Lt. Woodson accepted and performed all types of duties. Uniting and agreeing, Lt. Woodson was equal to all tasks assigned him.

When information of enemy concentrations was needed for future plans, Lt. Woodson was asked to secure them. Taking one of the enlisted men of the Battalion along with him, Lt. Woodson infiltrated far to the rear of the enemy lines and obtained two prisoners. These men he brought back through the lines and to the Command Post. The information furnished from the reports and equipment of the prisoners and by questioning, to which they were subjected, was sufficient to cover all the requirements of higher headquarters.

Troop A approached the town of Lohay, France, they were stopped by enemy mortar fire from the town. The mortar fire coming from Lohay was an obstacle in on the road that it was impossible for a vehicle to enter the town. Lt. Woodson volunteered to enter the town and try to remove the obstacle. Taking one enlisted man from the Marcel Battalion with him, Lt. Woodson infiltrated into the town. He advanced from house to house in the town until he was near to the mortar position, and then throwing hand grenades as he went, he charged the mortar crew while the comrade laid down some fire on the position. He killed one of the crew and the gun crew thought a heavy force was supporting him and they abandoned the gun and those who were not killed left the town. Lt. Woodson sought out the other enemy in the town and either killed them or drove them out of the town. In all, he killed

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Killed ten men and cleared the town of another fifteen. With the town (which has a normal population of approximately 500 persons) in his hands, Lt. Vaughan sent a message back to Troop A that the enemy had retreated and that he was on the other side of the town. It was now late in the evening and visibility was poor. The next morning, when under the direction of Lt. Vaughan, who had remained in the town all night, the roadblocks and mortar positions were subjected to artillery fire and the road cleared. The enemy personnel holding the roadblock and mortar positions were estimated at one to two hundred men.

When Troop A occupied Hambrill's the enemy shelling of the town was so accurate as to give credence to the suspicion that the enemy had a hidden radio in the town that was calling the corrections on the radio. Lt. Vaughan on his own initiative dressed in an enemy uniform and tried to find the hidden radio. Although he failed to find the radio, it is believed that he came so close that the station was forced to cease operations and leave Hambrill's.

Lt. Vaughan has since been ordered to report to the French Army and take over command of one of the companies of Urmans that he had helped to convert to the French Army.

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : General Donovan
 FROM : Chief SI
 SUBJECT: Field Report of Cpl. N. V. Olds (attached)

16,171
 Field Report
 x Olds, Nicholas V
 DATE: 17 March 1945
 x J. T. G.
 x SI
 x Japanese

With regard to the subject (a) Lack of sufficient transportation, and in connection with para 2 of that subtitle:

In Caserta in November I discussed this matter with Glavin. He understood the difficulty and sympathized with it; but at that time he had allocated, to Rome, as much transport as he could, and was handling the balance (in and around Caserta) in a pool.

W.S.
 W.S.

VD

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS
 Thru: Chief SI
 FROM : Earl Brennan

DATE: 16 March 1945

SUBJECT: Field Report of Cpl. Nicholas V. Olds

With reference to part four of the field report of Cpl. Nicholas V. Olds and in compliance with the memorandum of Chief, SI, dated 28 February, 1945, the following information is furnished:

A. SPECIFIC CRITICISM, PART IV

(a) Lack of sufficient transportation

On 24 April 1944 a request for two trucks, two five-passenger sedans, and four jeeps was made by this section to the Procurement and Supply Branch. The requisition was approved, and a cargo number was given to this order. This requisition, however, was later cancelled by the Procurement and Supply Branch and the reason given was that these vehicles were obtainable in the theater (copy of the requisition attached hereto for your information).

Subsequent to this cancellation, Mr. Scamporino urged in reports to us on several occasions that something be done to obtain vehicles for his use, as a lack of transportation was hampering his operations overseas. Concurrently this section submitted memoranda to the Chief, SI, pointing out the need for transportation to carry out our work overseas.

On 24 February, 1945, Col. Joseph Rodrigo submitted a memorandum to the Executive Officer, SI, Washington, outlining the shortage of transportation in Italy, and pointing out the importance of having adequate transportation facilities for the successful procurement of intelligence.

The Chief, SI, on March 1945, forwarded a memorandum to Col. Glavin, stating that he had been informed the Italian Division was being greatly handicapped by lack of motor cars, and requesting that three five-passenger cars and two station wagons be allocated to the Italian Division, SI, out of a recent shipment of motor cars to the theater.

(b) Supplies

A memorandum dated 29 December 1944, requesting certain supplies, was forwarded to Chief SI, and approved by him. However, this request was later cancelled with a notation that under General Order No. 75-4, these items should now be available in the theater. According to this General Order, the Strategic Services officers should normally have a stock pile of so-called barter items, etc.

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To: Director, OSS

- 2 -

16 March 1945

Further inquiry to the Chief, Italian Division, SI, on the present status of supplies was made subsequent to the cancellation of the above memorandum. To date, the only reply received was a communication stating that a detailed report will be forwarded at a later date. However, recent returnees from the field have informed us that in many instances barter items such as food, cigarettes, and other supplies within that category, were either not available or there was an insufficient quantity in stock to meet our needs. This lack of supplies has necessitated agents procuring them on their own initiative.

(c) Personnel

Since the return of Cpl. Olds, the question of personnel has been somewhat improved, even though we have no assurances that section-trained stenographers, translators or typists, earmarked for a particular assignment, will reach their destination, for upon their arrival in Italy, the Caserta headquarters frequently diverts this type of personnel to other branches depending upon their conception of the needs in the theater.

(d) Foreign persons in key positions

The specific problem of timely cooperation with foreign personages in key positions, mentioned in part four of Cpl. Olds' report, was based upon his request for four tires that was made to him by the Crown Prince of Italy. Cpl. Olds, through Mr. Scamporino, tried to fulfill this request, but either because of a lack of cooperation on the part of our OSS representatives in Caserta or due to the difficulty of procuring the tires, the favor requested by the Crown Prince was not fulfilled. The tires requested by Cpl. Olds were items not normally carried in stock by the Strategic Services officers, but could have either been purchased in the open market or procured through the Quartermaster Corps.

As you will recall, the Crown Prince was later appointed Luogotenente of the Realm, and it is quite probable that our relationship with the Prince and members of the Royal household could have been cemented earlier had we been able to do the favors requested of us.

(e) Overseas Pouch

The Chief, SI, by a recent memorandum, has established a procedure for the use of the overseas pouch for important contacts who are dealing with OSS. This procedure completely solves the problem indicated in Cpl. Olds' report.

E.B.
E.B.

Attachment: Copy of requisition
dated 24 April 1944

SECRET

COPY

COPY

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

REQUEST FOR SUPPLIES, EQUIPMENT, OR SERVICE

COPY

REGISTRATION NO

2020

DATE

24 APR 1964

8071-44-I

PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY BRANCH

Captain Jack Trane
Military Supply Office
208 North Building

DELIVER TO

Warehouse
Rosslyn, Virginia
CARGO 460455

CHARGE APPROPRIATION
DO NOT FILL IN

CHARGE ALLOTMENT

2101-44-08

PLEASE FURNISH IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS ABOVE THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WHICH I CERTIFY ARE NECESSARY FOR USE IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

X-11 and 7

SIGNATURE

LAP FORD

Captain, CMC.

APPROVED

UNION, PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY BOARD

[illegible]

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACE BELOW

TOTAL

[illegible]

FILLED BY

CHECKED BY

~~MAILED~~/DELIVERED BY

SHIPPED BY:

REV'T 8/1 HQ.

CONTINUATION SHEET

RECEIPT

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE MATERIALS AND/ OR SERVICES ITEMIZED ABOVE
HAVE BEEN RECEIVED IN THE QUANTITY AND QUALITY SPECIFIED EXCEPT
AS OTHERWISE NOTED

SIGNATURE

DATE

(NOTE AND FOLLOW CAREFULLY INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

16 (71)

TO : Earl Brennan
 FROM : Chief SI
 SUBJECT: Field Report of Corp. Nicholas Olds

DATE: 28 February 1945

General Donovan's office is sending down to me a number of field reports coming in from various geographic areas, indicating his interest in them and his desire to see that recommendations made in these reports are carried out as far as possible.

The attached report from Corp. Olds is one such report and you will see how it has been handled in the General's office up until now.

Will you kindly prepare for me a memorandum responsive to the General's request. I should think that it is possible to reply to his memorandum in two parts, namely those difficulties which were encountered in the field about which we can do nothing from here and certain criticisms concerning our omissions and commissions here in Washington which, if justified, either have been rectified or should be rectified.

I believe it will also be useful if you had a copy made of your memorandum and send it to Scamporino. Thus he will be able to note and rectify (so far as he can at his echelon) some of the difficulties encountered in the field.

It follows, of course, that many of these criticisms, though possibly justified at the time, no longer are applicable because operations have changed so much in their nature.


 W.H.S.
SECRET

17-10619 WHS
 Dear Whitner:

14002

I have read the field report of Cpl. Olds and have again read Part IV where he makes certain specific criticisms of field conditions. Will you let me know whether or not you let me know taken of these suggestions by your people and suggestions by opinion, are those worthy of merit and what has been done to put them into effect.

W. J. D.

Director's Office

OSS Form 3054
 (3308)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

TO : The Director

FROM : Secretariat

DATE: 17 February 1945

SUBJECT: Field report of Corporal Nicholas Olds

1. Attached is a report from Corporal Nicholas Olds who acted ~~as a liaison agent~~ for SI in Italy. He describes in some detail the course of his work, the contacts and accomplishments for which he was responsible.

2. He makes the overall criticism that men recruited to do high-level work should not be hampered by close restrictions on their activities. He also makes the following specific criticisms of field conditions:

- a. Lack of sufficient transportation.
- b. PX supplies and food rations should be made available to field agents.
- c. Lack of trained stenographers, translators and typists.
- d. Lack of cooperation in doing favors for persons in key positions.
- e. Closing of overseas pouch to letters of important persons with whom OSS is dealing.

W. B. Kantack
W. B. Kantack
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer

Attachment

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Field Report
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS
FROM : Chief, SI
SUBJECT: Field Report - Nicholas V. Olds

DATE: 5 February 1948

We submit herewith the field report of Cpl. Nicholas V. Olds. This is an account of his activities and of field conditions in Italy.

Whiting H. Shepherdson
Whiting H. Shepherdson

Attachment

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Chief, SI

FROM : Karl Brennan

SUBJECT: Field Report of Nicholas V. Olds

DATE: 2 February 1945

The field report of Cpl. Nicholas V. Olds, an account of his activities and of field conditions in Italy, is attached hereto in accordance with your revised memorandum of 12 December 1944.

Mr. Olds has spent eighteen months in the field, being away from the United States from 6 June 1943 to 15 December 1944. Mr. Olds was engaged principally in developing and reporting political and economic intelligence, and served as one of our principal contacts with members of the several Italian Governments, beginning with the first Badoglio Government, with the Italian Foreign Office, and with the leaders of the various Italian political parties.

E.B.
E. B.

Attachment: Field Report of Cpl. Nicholas V. Olds

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Corporal NICHOLAS V. OLDSPersonal Background:

He was born in State of Pennsylvania, near Uniontown, in 1903 of Italian parentage. Family moved to Detroit, Michigan, when he was 17 years of age and he graduated from high school in Detroit. Attended Detroit College of Law, graduated in June, 1927; passed bar examinations and admitted to the Michigan bar in September, 1927. Worked in law office while attending law school, but upon admission to the bar went into independent general practice of law. During the years 1933 and 1934, he was an Assistant Attorney-General of State of Michigan. In May, 1936, he was appointed special counsel to Michigan State Highway Department, which work he performed while conducting his own law practice; he held this position until leave of absence was granted in March, 1943, when he joined OSS. During last year of law practice, he was earning upwards of \$6000 per year.

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16.71
SECRET**I****Dates and Places Stationed:**

I embarked on 6 June 1943 and arrived at Casablanca on 13 June 1943; thence proceeded to Algiers where I remained until I proceeded to Palermo by boat, via Elsero, where I arrived on 23 July 1943, just two days after its fall to American forces. I was stationed in Palermo until about 17 December 1943, at which time I proceeded by convoy to Naples, arriving there on 23 December 1943. I was stationed in Naples until 13 July 1944 at which time I was transferred to Rome. I was stationed at Rome until my departure on or about 25 November 1944, arriving in the United States on 15 December 1944.

II**Duties and Activities in the Field:**

1. Shortly after our arrival in Palermo, I was assigned to a team that was to infiltrate behind enemy lines, but I was eliminated because of poor eyesight which required constant use of glasses. However, I drove the group into the lines as far as it was possible to go and then returned safely to our base in Palermo.

2. About the middle of August 1943, I was assigned to work with Professor Rudolph Winnaker of R & A, who had begun doing economic and political research and intelligence in Palermo in conjunction with our SI activities. Together, we set up the Palermo R & A office there. I continued with R & A until after Professor Winnaker was sent to the Italian government and collaborated with his successors, Lt. Richard Burkes, Professor Fred Fales and Lt. David Roberts. The experience gained from this work was extremely helpful in the work that followed in continental Italy.

3. In December 1943, I proceeded to Naples for the purpose of setting up a Political and Economic Intelligence Unit for the Italian Section, SI. This work was begun and contacts were established with political leaders of the major Italian parties, such as Count Sforza, of the Partito D'Azione, Senator Benedetto Croce of the

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Partito Liberale, Hon. Giulio Rodino of the Democrazia Cristiana. Captain Caputa maintained contact with Tedeschi of the Communist Party and Longobardi of the Socialist Party. Contacts were soon established with other minor leaders and sources were established for gathering industrial, labor and economic information. At the outset, Captain Joseph Caputa (then Lt. Caputa) and I were the only persons making contacts in the field. Later, in February 1944, when the Italian Government moved to Salerno, we were joined by Lt. Col. John A. Ricca (then Lt. Ricca) who was liaison to the Italian Government. Col. Ricca introduced me to all the high-ranking officials of the Italian Government, from Marshal Badoglio, while Col. Ricca was absent from the field in March and April 1944 on a mission to the United States, I maintained his liaison contacts with the Italian government as well as with the United States. During this period, I was able to make very close contacts with all the personnel of the Italian Foreign Office and, as a result, I was given considerable intelligence that they were desirous of transmitting to the United States.

d. For some time it had been the desire of Marshal Badoglio to send a personal emissary to the President to present at first hand the problems facing his government and the Italian nation. Such a mission would not have been approved or permitted by AC so he appealed to us for aid in preparing and conveying a person of his choice who had his full confidence to the United States. Such a mission was prepared by me under the supervision of Mr. Scamporino and Marshal Badoglio's personal emissary was brought by us to the United States. Here, he was of great aid in informing the President and our government of the political and economic conditions in Italy.

e. In April 1944, Marshal Badoglio received a letter from President Roosevelt in response to the message delivered to him by Colonel Ricca on his mission above-mentioned. In it the President by inference called upon the Italian government to prove what it had done in helping to drive the common enemy from its soil. Thus, upon my suggestion, and with my help, the task was undertaken by the Italian Foreign Office on the order of Marshal Badoglio to prepare a complete and detailed memorandum setting forth the total contribution that the Italian people, civilian and governmental had made in their efforts to drive the German Army out of Italy. This memorandum also contained a study of the obstacles encountered by the people and the government of Italy on account of the Armistice terms and the restrictions imposed by the Allied Control Commission. This study consisted of about 100 pages and when completed was turned over to us with a letter of transmittal signed by Prime Minister Bonomi (he had succeeded Badoglio by the time the study was completed). This memorandum was brought to the United States by Mr. Vincent Scamporino and sent to the State Department and the President. I wish to emphasize

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that all of the foregoing work was done by me under the fine supervision of Mr. Scamporino and Col. John A. Ricca.

f. On 13 July 1944, our Naples contingent moved to Rome to continue and augment our work there. I continued and expanded my contacts with the Italian Foreign Office. Shortly after my arrival, I was asked by Col. Ricca to undertake the project of gathering intelligence on Japan. Lt. Natoli had gone into Rome with the 3 Force and had made a report of his investigation on Japanese intelligence, but he had not yet produced anything concrete. I discussed the matter with Mr. Prunas, Secretary General of the Italian Foreign Office, who accorded me his whole-hearted cooperation by ordering all his subordinates to permit my agent (a former member of the Foreign Office) to make available to him all the reports and documents the office might have pertaining to Japan. As a result, we combed that office and various other Italian ministries for information and much was produced. I was informed by my contacts in the Foreign Office that under their jurisdiction the Italian Government maintained the "Istituto dell' Estremo e Medio Oriente" which interested itself with gathering information on Japan and the Far East. Although G-2, PWB and other Allied agencies had been there before us, yet we found certain secret underground chambers that yielded us a wealth of information on Japan. I found out that in Rome there was located the International Agriculture Institute which is established by and functions under a certain Geneva Convention. My Foreign Office agent was personally acquainted with a member of the Italian delegation there. The result was that this Italian professor at the Institute was the only man we could find who could read our Japanese written material, and in addition he turned over to me a large volume of his own material on Japan. I was told that any information on atmospheric conditions in and around Japan would be welcome. I discovered Prof. Eredia, the foremost meteorologist in Italy, who informed me that he had a lot of private data on meteorological variations in Japan and the Asiatic coastal area. As a result, he has compiled a detailed study on the subject which has already reached Washington. Many other sources of Japanese intelligence were found and explored and the amount and quality of intelligence on Japan that we got out of Rome was gratifying. In this project, I was under the able supervision of Col. Ricca, who also collaborated in gathering our Japanese material with his contacts in SDI, the Italian Naval, War and Aeronautical Ministries.

While I was engaged in gathering Japanese intelligence, it was called to my attention by Sgt. Ralph Ciluzzi (who was assisting me in this work) that a certain Brunetti, an Italian Colonel in the Italian Aeronautical Ministry, had been Aeronautical Attache to the Italian Embassy in Japan. It appeared that he might be in possession of valuable material on Japan. Lt. Natoli had mentioned him in his report, but only

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casually. I called this matter to the attention of Col. Rizza, who, in turn, discussed it with Major Corvo. The result was that we decided to locate Col. Brunetti and this was done through SIM. The upshot is that Col. Brunetti and Comdr. Pardo were sent to the United States to work in giving us the benefit of their knowledge on Japanese military matters.

g. In addition to gathering intelligence on Italian political events and material on Japan, I initiated a program of developing and collecting industrial and economic information for SI. While still in Salerno, I had been urging the Italian Foreign Office to interest itself in gathering information on industrial, economic and agricultural conditions in Italy. I saw that if I could help in setting up a division in the Foreign Office for this purpose, I would be able to obtain official information on these matters. After they arrived in Rome, such a division was organized by the Foreign Office under its power to negotiate commercial pacts and treaties and I was assured that copies of all their reports would be made available to me. Such was done, and when I left, a large volume of such reports had also been received by us with much more to come. In addition, I had established contacts with private industrial leaders who compiled and had given to me reports on the condition of their particular industry, such as rubber, electric power, radio, automobile market, etc.

h. Because of my almost daily contact with the Italian Foreign Office, Minister Prunas designated one of his men to assist me and facilitate my work with them. With the person selected, I would discuss internal political events, international affairs relating to Italy and any matter that appeared important, thus keeping our Government fully informed unofficially of the events and conditions in Italy. For instance, should a certain party take a particular position in regard to an Italian internal or international issue, we would discuss it. He then would sound out all those in the Foreign Office and the Ministries in charge of such matters and afterwards draft a report that would reflect the position of the Foreign Office or the Ministry concerned on the issue involved. However, all major political or international problems were discussed by me directly with Minister Prunas, who then would instruct his staff to make a memorandum of the facts and policy which would be given me for transmission in an unofficial character to our government. Several highly important subjects were being studied on that basis when I left Rome.

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III

Conditions in the Field

Having in mind that Italy has been invaded foot by foot and as a result has suffered appalling devastation, I feel confident in stating that, as a whole, our living conditions were fairly good. There were occasions when the proper working facilities were lacking, or were not provided on a scale we felt our work required, yet we got by in some manner. However, to be able to do a good job in gathering political and economic intelligence of a high level, one must deal with people in high places in government, finance and industry. This, perforce, means that the agent should be able to create and maintain a high grade of personal prestige. It cannot be hoped that people in key positions would be willing to mingle with an American who might turn out to be a nonentity. We should bear in mind that intelligence is not obtained like one gets a piece of pie from the automat by simply inserting a nickel in the slot. The agent should know all about the people he is dealing with--their friends, their habits and interests, their family life, their virtues and their vices, their upbringing and history, their mental, political and economic affiliations and outlook, etc. The agent must be capable of building up in the minds of the people in key positions that he is a person of importance, that he, too, occupies a key position in his organization and that his organization wields tremendous power back home. Such persons ordinarily are glad to collaborate in the gathering and compiling of sorely needed information when they are convinced that such information will get into proper channels back home where it can be utilized to enlighten officials who are charged with the all-important task of making decisions on policy that will profoundly affect the mutual interests and relations of Italy and the United States. If I may be permitted to make a generic criticism on the field conditions under which I had to work, the one I would like to emphasize is this one, namely, that we, as agents in the field, were not serviced in a manner befitting the high-level work that we were called upon to do, but on the other hand, were hampered by ill-considered limitations and restrictions imposed not by our immediate superior, Mr. Scamporino, but mostly by the limitations and restrictions placed on him. If the field agent is resourceful, has a level head and a strong moral character, he should be trusted and wide latitude of action and discretion given him. If he is not discreet and trustworthy, then he should not be there at all.

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IV

Specific Criticisms of Field Conditions

a. There has always been a lack of sufficient and proper transportation. Military vehicles cannot be used in this work. Consequently, Italian cars had to be requisitioned and these required constant attention to keep them in running condition. American civilian cars should be made available to agents.

b. Operational supplies in the form of PX supplies and food rations should be made available to field agents. While in Rome, I was forced to use my own PX supplies to hand out to people who had helped me in getting information. Food rations many times are more helpful in securing information than money, but I was informed in Rome that we could not be given any, since Quartermaster would not permit drawing of operational supplies.

c. Prior to October 1944, there was a complete lack of trained Steno-Translators and typists. I have heard rumors to the effect that this condition was brought about by the OSS organizational policy of proselyting all stenographers as soon as they arrived in Naples. Personnel earmarked for a particular section or branch did not, as a rule, report to that branch but were diverted on orders from Caserta. However, it is my impression at present that Mr. Seamporino has overcome some of the aforementioned difficulties.

d. The doing of favors for people in key positions is most helpful. Many people are not interested in being paid money, but call on us to help them in other ways. When it is possible to do these favors without endangering our interests we should be assisted in getting these favors done.

e. The use of the pouch has been one of the most fruitful means of not only doing key people a favor but also in getting real intelligence. A letter or a document that such a person asks us to transmit may not contain direct intelligence but it is valuable to us in finding out what are that person's interests and friends, his financial affairs, or family affairs, his mental and psychical make-up. To deal effectively with a person in high position, an agent should know all about that which enters into his total personality. These things can be disclosed in letters one writes to friends and acquaintances—even though the communication may be entirely devoid of information that could be termed intelligence. I understand that our pouch from overseas is now closed to the transmission of these communications.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

14201
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15 May 1945

✓
MEMORANDUM

TO: The Director
FROM: General Counsel
SUBJECT: Bland's Report

*Hold for WTH. ✓
as he requested comments from Special Funds Branch - CSC*

1. Certain suggestions with respect to the organization of a finance office in any organization similar to OSS which may be created in the future, were made by Thomas F. Bland, former Special Funds officer in Cairo, to Colonel W. L. Rehm in a report dated 23 January 1945. This report was forwarded to you by the Secretariat on 16 February 1945 and was subsequently referred to me with the request that the suggestions of Mr. Bland be discussed with Special Funds and recommendations thereon be submitted to you. The entire matter has been reviewed and considered by Mr. Asmuth of this Office with Special Funds Branch.
2. We submit the following comments and recommendations on Mr. Bland's suggestions, which will be considered in the order in which they appear in his memorandum.
3. "A great many trained finance and account men should be among the first recruits for field operations."

In the creation of a new intelligence agency which is granted the use of "special funds", the desirability of fully staffing field officers with trained and experienced finance men is unquestionable. As Mr. Bland suggests, the recruitment of such personnel should have a high priority. Special Funds Branch, OSS, has an extensive coverage in all theatres of operation at the present time as is shown by the attached chart. In general the growth

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of the field organization of Special Funds Branch has been in step with the growth of OSS in the various theatres. Mr. Bland comments in his report that in the early stages of the development in the Cairo office, there was no Special Funds officer as such, but rather the individuals who were dispatched to Cairo to work in the office were sent forward with funds in their possession. But as soon as the groundwork was laid for the establishment of the Cairo office, finance officers with proper training were sent to the field by Special Funds Branch, Washington. Mr. Bland's suggestion points to the optimum situation. Of course, as a practical matter, the wartime shortages of adequately trained finance men, transportation to the field, etc., must be taken into account in reviewing the experience of OSS, Special Funds Branch. Furthermore, the critical demands of actual operations sometimes necessitated the assignment of Special Funds representatives in the field to duties in addition to their Special Funds work. Thus, in the interests of devoting every resource to the most vital tasks at hand, situations were necessarily created where some attention to financial details had to be sacrificed.

4. "Finance should be completely informed on operation plans, including the most secret of operations, because lack of knowledge in finance leads to revelation of secret operations through the handling of the financial end which is always an integral part of any operation and in itself must be planned to permit proper execution without breach of security."

If clandestine operations are to be conducted successfully in enemy, enemy-occupied, and neutral territories, the agents and operatives must have adequate funds in the currency in use in the territory or territories in which the operations are being conducted. In order to have supplies of the necessary currencies available for such operations, it is, of course, necessary for the Finance Branch to have an intimate knowledge of the nature and the scope of the operations which are to be undertaken. Special Funds Branch, OSS, has an enviable record in this regard. Although Special Funds Branch has faced a difficult task in procuring the varied currencies peculiar to the areas throughout the world in which OSS operations have been conducted, through close coordination between Special Funds Branch and the operational branches of OSS in both Washington and the field, field operations of the agency have never been held up or rendered insecure through lack of sufficient funds in the proper currencies.

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5. "The central office should be well staffed with accountants who are familiar with operations on a world wide scale."

It is not clear what Mr. Bland means by the term "central office." Presumably, he refers to headquarters in Washington rather than the base in each theatre. Special Funds Branch has an accounting and audit division in its Washington office which is charged with the keeping of books and records on all unvouchered funds. This division's Washington staff is presently composed of six accountants, assisted by the necessary stenographers and clerks. It trains Special Funds field representatives, recruited in the United States, prior to their overseas assignments. Although there were no fixed precedents for an accounting procedure for special funds, a highly detailed and coordinated accounting system has been developed for the use of all OSS installations. The most recent instructions issued by Special Funds Branch on a "Uniform Accounting Procedure" are attached hereto. This accounting system should certainly be made available to any new intelligence agency which might be created in the future.

6. "By the advice and cooperation of the above mentioned men the overall system should be well worked out in detail before any missions are sent out; this system should be adequate but not too rigid."

The recommendation that missions should be briefed on finance matters should be followed. The experience of Special Funds Branch indicates that such briefing cannot be standardized but must be "tailor-made" for the particular mission. Instructions on the use of funds, details of accounting, receipts and documentary evidence which should be procured, etc., vary according to the locale in which the mission will operate and the duration and extent of its operations. Lectures in the use of funds have been given by Mr. Emerson Bigelow of Special Funds Branch at schools run by Schools and Training Branch. General instructions in accounting for funds might also be given during the student's schooling but more detailed instructions must necessarily await the formation of the particular mission. These instructions are usually given by Special Funds Officers in the field to the person or persons in the mission who are charged with the responsibility of handling the funds. Where missions proceed directly to the field from Washington, the instructions are given by Special Funds Branch, Washington. The importance of this recommendation cannot be overemphasized, since it is basic to an orderly and accurate finance and accounting procedure.

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7. "All missions sent out should, if possible, have in the group a finance trained individual preferably an accountant to insure the proper handling of funds from the first instance. If this is not practical, one adaptable member of the group should be trained in the finance office thoroughly so that the central or home office could be assured of proper records which are completely interpretable."

This suggestion is an amplification of Mr. Bland's fourth suggestion. While it would be highly desirable from a financial and accounting standpoint to staff every mission with a trained and experienced finance officer, the number of such trained personnel required in an operation on the scale of OSS makes the suggestion impracticable. It has been found most difficult to procure the relatively limited number of such personnel necessary to staff the Washington headquarters and base field offices. Furthermore, the additional expenses of having specialists of this type with each mission would probably be justified in only rare cases. What is more, from a security and operational standpoint, it would not be feasible to have an additional man on small missions for this sole purpose. However, the suggestion that an adaptable member of the group should be trained in finance should be followed wherever circumstances permit.

8. "The home or central office should be set up from the very beginning on a large scale capable of a complete and detailed control over the whole field so that coordination of the world-wide organization could be effectively handled. Particularly with regard to policy, care should be exercised on this point, so as not to strangle the operation."

The term "home or central office" presumably means headquarters in Washington. The growth of the organization in the field necessarily determines the size of the headquarters office. Until the scope of field operations is known, it is obviously impossible to fix the size of the staff in Washington.

9. "In a war time organization such as OSS, Civil Service for employees should be completely eliminated because of their very nature war time operations do not lend

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themselves to the red tape of Civil Service. At the inception of such an organization all employees who are drafted from Civil Service should be given Excepted Appointments at the instance, so that the policy for payroll can be set up and handled without the interference of attempting set pay in accordance with Civil Service regulations, which by their very nature, are a misfit in a war time operation overseas. The payroll policy, however, should be a complete and detailed payroll system which is designed to embrace all special cases in a uniform and unquestionable manner."


Mr. Bland's suggestion that no personnel should be sent overseas on Civil Service is at variance with the general attitude of Special Funds Officers in the field. He states that payroll policies should be established and handled without the interference of fixing salaries in accordance with Civil Service regulations. But on the other hand he says that payroll policy should be complete and detailed, and should be designed to embrace all cases in a uniform and unquestionable manner. Civil Service regulations are intended to accomplish the result which Mr. Bland desires. It is obvious that for security reasons Civil Service procedures cannot be followed in the cases of agents and operatives. In addition, such regulations usually cannot be complied with as respects personnel in neutral countries and in areas where Treasury Department pay facilities are not available, etc. But Mr. Bland has not set forth any arguments, other than a broad allegation of red-tape, against hiring clerical, stenographic, and general administrative personnel on Civil Service at bases such as London, Algiers, etc. While it is absolutely necessary for an agency such as OSS to have the maximum flexibility in arranging the terms of employment for a large number of its personnel, we are not satisfied that Civil Service is not workable and satisfactory as regards the average administrative employee stationed at large overseas bases. His comments would be equally applicable to all war agencies.

10. "An audit group should be set up, staffed with well trained C.P.A.'s. These men to travel from theater to theater completing audits and unifying systems to the benefit of the organization, this group should make their report direct to the central or home office, such a procedure would be beneficial both to the home office and to the men in the field. These men should be trained in the audit function very completely."

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Whether or not this recommendation should be followed by a future intelligence agency would depend largely upon the scope and the nature of its operations. If operations are on a relatively small scale and cover is very tight, it would be impracticable and probably inadvisable from a security standpoint to have travelling auditors examining books of operatives and missions. On the other hand, if there are fairly sizeable bases in different areas of the world, Mr. Bland's suggestion is important. Special Funds Branch has recognized the desirability of sending auditors to overseas installations. These auditors should report directly to Washington, as Mr. Bland suggests. Audits have already been made in Greece and Turkey, and Special Funds Branch is arranging for an auditor to proceed to Caserta, Paris and London and for another auditor to go to the Far East.


James B. Donovan

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan

DATE: 8 March 1945

FROM : Secretariat

1945 MAR 17 10 38

SUBJECT: Field Report of Capt. George A. Greenfield

1. Attached is a report from Capt. George A. Greenfield who undertook a survey of Communications manpower in ETO and MedTO.

2. He concluded that in general few changes are possible unless the functions of the branch are limited by a high echelon directive. Specifically he makes the following comments on the two theaters:

a. Italy - if operations are continued at the present level at best only small reductions are possible despite the moves from Caserta to Rome, and Brindisi to Florence. Col. Mero would welcome an order for a reduction of 40% because he believes much of the traffic is relatively unimportant. This would, of course, involve depriving certain OSS projects of their present communications facilities.

b. ETO - the system recently installed in this theater will not enable reduction in force. The new system was worked out in order to facilitate sending by the men in the field. If reduction is ordered, however, a recent study prepared by a member of Col. Forgan's Executive Staff will serve to determine priorities for the field units.

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : General William J. Donovan
 FROM : Captain George A. Greenfield
 SUBJECT: Report on Temporary Duty in Mediterranean and European
 Theaters of Operation.

DATE: 6 March 1945

1. In compliance with the instructions of the Chief of Communications Branch, I proceeded on 10 January 1945 to Caserta, Italy, for the purpose of visiting Communications installations throughout Italy, France, and England. I was specifically charged with surveying the Communications manpower in the two theaters both as to requirements and current utilization. I returned to Washington, D.C., 24 February 1945.

2. Itinerary:

A. Italy

1. Caserta
2. Rome
3. Florence

B. ETO

1. Paris
2. London

3. CASERTA

Since Caserta is the central administrative point for OSS in Italy, a substantial portion of Communications personnel in the theater is located there. Not only is Caserta a teletype terminal for Bari-Caserta and Rome-Caserta administrative traffic, but it is also the focal point for intelligence traffic relayed from the Bari and Rome receiving stations.

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Attachment to Report of M25 Coolidge - 1/6/88

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : General Donovan
 FROM : W. H. Shepherdson
 SUBJECT: Major Bari's Report

DATE: 20 March 1948

You ask for my recommendations.

(A) I agree with Mr. Loud's comments on the two recommendations made by the Major, (1) (2).

(B) I suggest that Major Bari's report be filed.

WHS
 W. H. S.

LT Thinner
 Please see that these
 are put into effect

SECRET

OSS Form 10R40

DATE 17 March 1945

TO: Mr. Shepardson

Please note the General's
question.

FROM: Executive Office

(32816)

EXT. _____

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OES

FROM : Chief, OI

SUBJECT: Field Report of Major Subhi M. Sadi

DATE: 18 March 1948

JL 450
Field Report
Sadi: JH


(METO)

Major Subhi Sadi's field report is submitted herewith. Your attention is called to the comments on Major Sadi's report made by the OI Divisional Deputy for the Near-Middle East, Mr. Gordon Loud.

Whitney H. Shepardson
Whitney H. Shepardson

What is your
recommendation?

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16, 47 3
SECRET

Filing

Mr. Shepardson

Lt. Thrun

21 March 1945

x Corbett, V. G. C.
x MEDIC
x S I

General Donovan asked that I call to your attention for information and appropriate action the following paragraphs from Field Report of Major George C. Corbett:

"Conditions in the field which might be improved:

On the whole, the work in the field was carried out very efficiently, with good results. I do believe that Intelligence has been the most outstanding branch and has accomplished more than any of the others. It is a little late in the war to bring this point up but it is my feeling that the recruitment of personnel could have been handled better. At the beginning there was a critical shortage of personnel and many requests were made on Washington. These requests were filled very slowly, and late, by Washington and towards the last months of 1944 personnel started to arrive in large numbers. At this time I could see that the work was already slackening off. I do not know what information was sent back from the field but do feel that something should have been done to stop some of this personnel from coming over which would have been a great saving in transportation costs.

"Specific difficulties in the field of which I personally became aware: As everybody can well appreciate the agent who operates behind the lines is the backbone of our organization. When he reports to Headquarters he should have a suitable place to stay where regular meals could be served. This billet should be located away from Headquarters and proper means set up for his reception, etc.

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SECRET

"To my knowledge, every time an agent arrived, there was confusion as to where he was to sleep and eat and how he could be isolated for security reasons. There were repeated requests made on services by SI to have places requisitioned for this purpose but for some reason were never fulfilled to the satisfaction of SI. I recommend that a well organized and coordinated plan be set up in all Theaters to make the agent feel welcome for the work he has accomplished and that his stay be made as comfortable as possible and located in such a billet so he can be isolated for OSS's security as well as his own. I am sure that this can be accomplished with a little foresight and planning."

Robert Thorne

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS

FROM : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Field Report - Major George C. Corbett

DATE: 19 March 1946

Attached is a report from Major Corbett, who served in various intelligence administrative capacities during his tour of duty with 2677th Regiment.

W. H. Sheperdson
 Whitney H. Sheperdson

Attachment

W. H. Sheperdson

This is your model

the memorandum

to be

very

06K 43

SECRET

Memorandum sent also to:
Major Sidney W. Little,
Personnel Officer, China Theater

J.E.S.G.

George O. Corbett,
Major, Inf.

To my knowledge, every time an agent arrived, there was confusion as to where he was to sleep and eat and how he could be located for security reasons. There were places requested made on orders by SI to have rooms never fulfilled to the satisfaction of SI. I recommend that a well organized and coordinated plan be set up in all theaters to make the agent feel welcome for the work he has accomplished and that his stay be made as comfortable as possible and located in such a place so he can be located for SI's security as well as his own. I am sure that this can be accomplished with a little forethought and planning.

"Specific difficulties in the field of which I personally become aware as everybody can well appreciate the agent who operates behind the lines is the backbone of our organization. When he reports to Headquarters, he should have a suitable place to stay where regular meals could be served. This place should be located away from Headquarters and proper means set up for his reception, etc.

For your information -- the following report from SI, MEDTO, may interest you in connection with your own plans there.

TO: Major Francis M. Smith,
Personnel Officer, India-Burma Theater

FROM: John H. O'Garra, Deputy Director-Personnel

SUBJECT: Excerpt from SI MEDTO Report

SECRET

TO: Chief, SI
To be forwarded to Director, OSS

FROM: Major George C. Corbett

SUBJECT: Overseas Report from Caserta, Italy.

SECRET

Overseas Itinerary:

8 May 1944 dep. Washington D.C.
 10 May 1944 reported for duty in Algiers
 6 July 1944 moved to Caserta, Italy
 29 February 1945 dep. Caserta, Italy
 12 March 1945 arr. Washington, D.C.

Duties overseas, progress of work and achievements:

On arrival in Algiers, reported to Colonel T. Early, Acting Intelligence Officer during absence of Colonel J. Rodrigo. The first two weeks were spent in reviewing cables and reports and familiarizing myself with the SI setup. I then took over the assignment of Assistant Chief of SI. In this assignment, assisted the Chief of SI in the coordination and administration of the various desks then located in Algiers. They included the French, Spanish, Italian, Labor and later the Swiss desks.

In June 1944 the Chief of SI was sent on a Special Mission and I was appointed Acting Chief, SI. In this assignment, I continued the same type of work and also maintained liaison between our Headquarters and AFHQ.

During the first part of July plans were formulated for the move of Headquarters to Caserta, Italy. Colonel Rodrigo assigned me with the responsibility of preparing the move of the Intelligence Section to Caserta. This move called for the rearrangement of the desks. The French and Spanish desks were to remain in Algiers, the Italian and Swiss desks were to move to Caserta and the Labor desk to Bari. All plans were made and we proceeded to Caserta on 6 July 1944 with the first contingent. On arrival in Caserta, I located office space to accommodate personnel and equipment and immediately set up a working organization. During the months of July and August I was Assistant Intelligence Officer as well as Acting Chief of SI, as there was a shortage of personnel during this period. In these assignments I handled cable traffic and reports, and re-established liaison between our Headquarters and AFHQ. During Colonel Rodrigo's absence I ran the Intelligence Office and made decisions that could be made with my rank as Captain.

One night the latter part of August the C.O. called me into his quarters and said that 16 complete German uniforms were needed by morning to be used on a special operation and that he would like me to procure them. I assured him that the uniforms would be on hand at the stated time and immediately started running over in my mind the most likely place they could be found at that late hour. My first thought was the POW camp in Aversa so obtained a jeep and arrived there at 01:00. It was necessary to awaken the party in charge of the prisoners and we

SECRET

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both in turn had the prisoners get completely dressed and form out in their company street with the pretext that they were going to be moved. With flashlights we went up and down the formation and had the prisoners surrender the clothing that was needed. The operation was completed and the uniforms were on hand at Headquarters at 0400.

At a Planning Board Meeting on 28 August 1944 I was selected by General Donovan to organize an oil survey team to fly into Rumania with the least possible delay, with the mission of making a survey of the bomb damage to the refineries in the Ploesti area. With the assistance of two other officers the team was selected, organized, briefed and equipped, and in 4 days landed in Bucharest, Rumania. I have submitted a personal report with pictorial coverage of this mission so will not go into details. In addition to my participation in surveying the refinery bomb damage, I assisted in the rounding up of wounded airmen in isolated areas of Rumania. Also made a complete survey of the flak gun emplacements and the smoke pots, collecting enemy documents where available. Over 1 1/2 tons of documents and papers were collected by the team as a whole, and on the night of 13 September 1944 we flew back to Italy with our information. For my part in this mission I have been awarded the Bronze Star Medal.

The 1st of October 1944 I was loaned by Intelligence Staff to be assistant to the Executive Officer, then Colonel T. Early. Soon afterwards cables were received from Washington, D.C. to process recommendations for awards for deserving OSS personnel. I was appointed by Colonel Early as head of the Awards and Decorations Board and with a small staff processed approximately 150 names which were submitted. Of the 150 names over 100 recommendations for awards were prepared and submitted to Commanding General, MTOUSA, for consideration and approval. At the present time these recommendations are being processed by MTOUSA and many have already been awarded.

After this assignment was completed, I reverted back to the Intelligence Staff where to do liaison work between our Headquarters and AFHQ.

As the Intelligence Staff was overstaffed, I felt that my services could not be utilized to their best advantage, so requested that I be returned to Washington, D.C. for reassignment in another Theater.

Conditions in the field which might be improved: On the whole, the work in the field was carried out very efficiently, with good results. I do believe that Intelligence has been the most outstanding branch and has accomplished more than any of the others. It is a little late in the war to bring this point up but it is my feeling that the recruitment of personnel could have been handled better.

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- 3 -


At the beginning there was a critical shortage of personnel and many requests were made on Washington. These requests were filled very slowly and late, by Washington and towards the last months of 1944 personnel started to arrive in large numbers. At this time I could see that the work was already slackening off. I do not know what information was sent back from the field but do feel that something should have been done to stop some of this personnel from coming over which would have been a great saving in transportation costs.

Specific difficulties in the field of which I personally became aware: As everybody can well appreciate the agent who operates behind the lines is the backbone of our organization. When he reports to Headquarters he should have a suitable place to stay where regular meals could be served. This billet should be located away from Headquarters and proper means set up for his reception, etc.

To my knowledge, every time an agent arrived, there was confusion as to where he was to sleep and eat and how he could be isolated for security reasons. There were repeated requests made on services by SI to have places requisitioned for this purpose but for some reason were never fulfilled to the satisfaction of SI. I recommend that a well organized and coordinated plan be set up in all Theaters to make the agent feel welcome for the work he has accomplished and that his stay be made as comfortable as possible and located in such a billet so he can be isolated for OSS's security as well as his own. I am sure that this can be accomplished with a little foresight and planning.

GEORGE C. CORBETT,
Major, Inf.

SECRET



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

TO : General Donovan

FROM : Secretariat

DATE: 21 March 1945

SUBJECT: Field Report of Alfred E. Williams, CSP(P), USNR

Field Report 16, 492
x Williams, Alfred E.
x Field Photo
x 2th

✓

Attached is a brief report from CPO Alfred E. Williams giving a brief chronological account of his duties with Field Photographic in ETO.

W. B. Kantack
W. B. Kantack
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer

Attachment

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

20 Mar 1948

SECRET

To: Capt. W. Byron Kantaak, AUS
Reports Officer
Rm. 209, So. Bldg.

From: Chief, Field Photographic Branch.

Subj: Report of Overseas Assignment
Re: Alfred E. Williams, CSp(P), USNR, #563-88-97.

1. Enclosed is report prepared by subject man in accordance with recent request from your office.
2. CPO Williams is currently on leave and will be available in Washington, DC, on 22 April for further consultation concerning his report if necessary.

John W. English
JOHN W. ENGLISH, Lt., USNR
Executive Officer
Field Photo. Br., OSS
By direction

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

16,492
Field Report
Williams, A. E.
SECRET

7 March 1945

To: Chief, Field Photographic Branch, OSS
From: Alfred E. Williams, CSp(P), USNR
Subject: Report of Overseas Assignment

July 1943 - Left Washington, D. C. for London, England.
In charge of personnel and shipment of one hundred and sixty cases of camera gear.
Arriving ETO August 13 with all gear intact.
This gear was checked in by Lt. Armistead in my absence.

August 22 to September 15, 1943 - Secret mission. Scotland for Joint Chiefs of Staff under Col. Locker.
In charge of personnel and arranging of shooting schedule. This was a record of simulated battle sound.

September to November - Set up and in charge of Photostat Dept. for OSS, most of the work being done for X2 and X9 Branch. This latter was made a special department apart from Field Photographic Branch under Lt. Jamison, U.S.A.

November 19 to November 28, 1943 - Coastal Command submarine patrol, Ireland, for the purpose of photographing the attack on a submarine.

December 26, 1943 to February 19, 1944 - Coastal Command Gibraltar, French Morocco, and Azores. Acting liaison officer with British, whom I found to be more than willing to cooperate by letting us photograph in their most secret places.

February to April 1944 - London office, head of Transportation and O.O.D. Active in Lt. Armistead's absence as personnel officer.

May 1944 - Getting supplies and installing cameras on landing craft for D-Day activities. This project required the welding of steel plates.

SECRET

Chief, Field Photographic Branch, OSS -- 2

SECRET

setting batteries and switches for power supply. Cameras were mounted on American and British ships to cover best view of Beach. Project was turned over to Lt. Wetzler, A.P.S.

June 12 to July 2, 1944 - D-Day activities photographing landings and fall of Cherbourg. Phoenix barges in tow for Mullbury Project A and B. This project was floating docks and portable break water.

July 5 to August 22, 1944 - Assistant director and liaison officer L.30 - OSS picture.

August 24 to January 20, 1945 - France, in charge of personnel, arranging of assignments, procurement of supplies, setting up lab and quarters, and administrative officer in charge.

Arrived in Washington, D. C. February 18, 1945.

Alfred E. Williams
Alfred E. Williams
CSP(P), USNR

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Acting Director
 FROM : Secretariat
 SUBJECT: Field Report of #366

SECRET
Field Report
 DATE: 29 May 1949
 1366

1. #366 was assigned to Angola, Portuguese West Africa as American Vice Consul. He was able to build up valuable connections with local military, naval and civilian officials and therefore obtained intelligence which the State Department previously had been unable to secure. Since the reporting of the American consuls in Angola was inadequate, as admitted by the U. S. State Department, the fact that OSS covered all subjects thoroughly has strengthened OSS/State Department relations in this area.

2. #366 recommends:

- a) that the State Department letter of introduction, recently drafted by the Africa division and cleared unofficially by the Desk men in the division, be sent out to posts where OSS agents have been assigned;
- b) that all OSS men going into the field be properly indoctrinated as concerns State Department;
- c) that an American courier service be established, to eliminate the use of the King's messenger;
- d) that civilians in the field receive due credit for their accomplishments, either by decoration, commission, official citation or commendation;
- e) that desk men have previous field service;

SECRET

OSD Form 1084b

DATE 5/2/45TO: General MagruderPM

JUN 4 12 01 PM '45

I think this would be
interesting to you, in view
of the whole African set-up.

C.S.C.

*Returned To
files - 10/10/45
JCS*

FROM: _____

(37816)

EXT. _____

SECRET

- 2 -

f) that an agent be assigned a definite period for his foreign duty;

g) that an agent in the tropics be given 30 days' leave after six months, to be taken near-by in a spot more healthful than his post.

2. #366 notes that any agent in Angola must know Portuguese.

W. B. Kantack
W. B. Kantack
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer

Attachment

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS
FROM : Chief, SI
SUBJECT: Field Report - #368

DATE: 23 March 1948

The attached report is submitted by a representative
of the Africa Division SI.

Your particular attention is invited to the accompany-
ing comments made by Mr. R. Boulton, Divisional Deputy, SI
Africa Division.

Whitney H. Shepherdson
Whitney H. Shepherdson

Attachments

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • **SECRET** UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, SI

FROM : Divisional Deputy, SI, Africa Division

SUBJECT: Comments on Angola Field Report by 366

DATE: 20 March 1946

1. This Representative had a particularly trying time in the field because of (a) friction on a personal basis between most of the few American residents in the Colony, the majority of whom were U. S. government officials; (b) delay in providing replacement for him since the Portuguese government held up the visa for his replacement for more than six months. As a result, his report shows a certain inferiority complex about the work which he has performed. The details are not exaggerated ~~the~~ the difficulties, but it should be noted that the Representative leans toward making claims for what he has accomplished. His field experience would lead him amply to believe that if he did not make these claims, no one would make them for him. This is shown particularly in paragraph 7 (k), page 7.

2. The friction referred to in paragraph 8, page 11, revolves principally around Linton Wells of USOC, about whom a major controversy between FEA and State is still at present raging. Charles McDaniels of the Cabinda Company of which the same thing is true, and the five Consuls under which the Representative served. One of these Consuls (the most exaggerated case) was subsequently recalled by the Department and discharged from the Foreign Service for extreme negligence of duty and for continued drunkenness. This condition is referred to in paragraph 7 (l), page 8.

3. The Representative's statement that OSS provided the bulk of reporting from Angola is largely true as far as the State Department is concerned. Time after time the Political Division of the Department has commented on, or tacitly admitted that they are better informed of current conditions in Angola through OSS disseminations than through communications of the Consuls. On the other hand, it is likewise true that Linton Wells has provided a tremendous amount of commercial and economic information to FEA and USOC, although at the cost of rendering himself persona non grata to everyone, Portuguese and Americans alike, except those who were aided by his commercial activities.

4. This Representative is extremely earnest, sincere and hardworking. He is completely cooperative in every way. The minor details of a controversial nature in his report should not be construed to the contrary.

5. It is the intention of the Division to reassign this Representative to Lourenco Marques after a period of two months or so of indoctrination on the Desk. The Representative of the Division of African Affairs of the Department of State for this territory has requested OSS to send him out with the title of Vice Consul. That, I

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believe, speaks for the reputation which this Representative has acquired in spite of the difficult condition under which he had to work.

6. The Representative's several recommendations are largely beyond the power of the Division to effect. Those of major concern are (a) the establishment of an all-American courier service, eliminating the necessity of using the King's messenger, is highly desirable; (b) the "State Letter" referred to in paragraph 8 (a), page 9, which has been widely discussed in OSS, and which has been cleared unofficially by Fletcher Warren, Jack Neal, and the several Desk men in the Division of African Affairs, is a measure which would do more to improve field relations between OSS men and the several Consuls with whom they serve than any one single thing; (c) the matter of credit referred to in 8 (c) for civilians, whether by commission, official citation, commendation, or civilian decoration is something which the organization must solve if the morale of its devoted employees, such as this one, is to be maintained.



R. Boulton

SECRET

Handwritten: Report No. 499
SECRET!

22 February 1946

To: Executive Officer, SI (For submission
to Chief, SI, and Director, OSS)

From: # 366

Subject: Report on Field Conditions in Angola, Portuguese West Africa

1. ITINERARY: No. 366 left for his post in Luanda, Angola on November 25th, 1942 via commercial air line to Miami, ATC to Leopoldville, Belgian Congo, Railway from Leopoldville to Matadi (Belgian Congo) and chartered car from Matadi to Luanda arriving at his destination on December 7th, 1942, thereby establishing a record which has held to this day. He had been told that this was to have been a six month assignment with a possible eight month maximum but unforeseen circumstances made it necessary for him to remain at his post continuously for a two year period. He left Lobito, Angola on M/V Tarn on November 22nd, 1944 and arrived in New York on December 15th, 1944, checking in at Washington on the morning of the 16th.

2. OBJECTIVES: On November 25th, 1942 No. 366 was shown a letter of instruction and within the hour was enroute to Africa. The broad objectives were:

- a. To act as communications liaison with the other OSS representatives working in Angola.
- b. To discover and report on the nature of Axis operations in Angola.
- c. To obtain military, political and economic information from Angola which is not available through other existing channels.

3. No. 366 went out as American Vice Consul and actually worked at this job. For more than a year and a half he accompanied the

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the USCCO representatives on all calls, official and otherwise, in the capacity of interpreter. He also took over the O.W.I. section and handled publicity, etc. While these duties took up all of his time they did pay dividends for he came to know practically everyone in Luanda personally and as a result was able to gather intelligence from good sources without too much difficulty.

It must be noted here that the Colony of Angola is peculiar in that Portuguese is practically an exclusive language and without a knowledge of it a foreigner is practically lost. No. 366 knows Portuguese and he made it his business to be on hand and to help every American who came to Luanda. This meant additional contacts and afforded excellent cover for assistance to OSS personnel whenever it was needed, for help to them afforded no exception to the policy established by him.

4. COMMUNICATIONS: For two years No. 366 acted as communications liason with the other OSS representatives working in Angola. During that period he served under five different Consuls, all of whom insisted and/or suggested at one time or another that they be given copies of all reports and messages going out of the Luanda Consulate. This was never done. Your agent not only took care of OSS telegrams but also assisted with messages of the State Department and other U. S. Government agencies, taking all of them personally to the radio and telegraph stations in Luanda. This not only covered OSS communications but was the direct cause of a general speed up in all American communications out of Luanda, in addition to good will which was created as a result of this. Many times we were able to send out messages ahead of others already in the telegraph office, at no extra cost, merely because we were on friendly terms with the operators and

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they were pleased to be of special service.

Pouch facilities leave much to be desired and are very irregular. The King's Messenger brings and takes our pouches to and from Leopoldville along with the British bags. He travels by auto and averages a trip once every three weeks or a month, although we have often waited five weeks for mail. Those of us stationed out there would appreciate our own mail service for reasons of security and speed but practically all OSS reports have been of a routine nature and the time element is not too important so we have not pressed the point, feeling that such action should be decided upon by the State Department.

5. AXIS OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA: From 1942 to late 1943 the Axis nationals in Angola were quite active. Reports on their activities were furnished from time to time. These included check-ups on clandestine radio stations, submarine rumors, IDB activities and illegal sisal transactions with Portuguese planters and traders. During the past year the Germans in Angola have been leading very quiet lives and have shunned all publicity. They admit defeat and are trying to ingratiate themselves in Portuguese West Africa.

6. MILITARY - POLITICAL - ECONOMIC INFORMATION: No. 366 is a close friend of many of the military and naval officers in Luanda and associated with them socially. He is also a personal friend of Antonio Correia de Freitas, Director of "A Provincia de Angola" and used to visit the former frequently. During 1944 No. 366 was shown all news dispatches which were censored by the Governor General's office and same were discussed with Mr. Correia de Freitas. His work for USCC and the Consulate established

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him as the person in whom the Portuguese have confidence and made for excellent personal contacts in practically all government departments and import and export firms in Luanda.

For more than a year and a half No. 366 made it a point to patronize the several restaurants in town for all of his meals and in this manner built up his acquaintanceship with a large number of minor functionaries of his own age and got to be known as "one of the boys", (at considerable cost to his stomach). The foregoing and other contacts provided sources of information which was not available through other existing channels.

6. There was practically no military, political or economic information available on Angola prior to the arrival of # 366 and other agents. During the latter part of 1942 and the whole of 1943 and 1944, # 366 sent in reports covering all of these subjects and is informed that the background file is now complete. During this period the American Consuls stationed in Angola failed to make any reporting of consequence as admitted by the U. S. Department of State, and the fact that OSS did cover these subjects thoroughly has strengthened our position with that august body immeasurably.

7. PROGRESS OF THE WORK AND ACHIEVEMENTS:

a. When # 366 arrived in Luanda the American Consulate there was not yet opened. It took months of continuous, hard work, in the interests of the State Department (and cover) to properly set it up, develop contacts and build up sources of information. In spite of all of the cooperation given to State this agent had nothing which resembled an office until three months ago, but when he left his post he turned over an office and files to his replacement, located in the American Consulate.

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complete in every detail, including cover, without a single hitch.

b. In spite of the fact that an OSS auto and three different shipments of spare parts arrived in Luanda over a period of more than a year, this agent was able to have everything cleared through customs (with practically no help from the several American Consuls) at a fraction of the cost (\$600 as compared to \$3,000 plus 110% on CIF at Luanda). The car and parts were turned over to # 937 within half a day, under perfect cover and without any difficulty. This agent was also able to obtain a permanent driver's license for his replacement (a thing which the British have never been able to obtain, even to this day).

c. The regular monthly gasoline ration for a private car is 60 litres. # 306 had an allowance of 200 litres per month which he managed to obtain (against the wishes of the American Consul) through his own efforts. The British have a monthly allowance of only 120 litres per month. Before he left he was assured by the Chief of Police that the new owner of the car, being attached to the American Consulate, would also receive the usual 200 litres.

d. This agent was the only American in Angola who did not become involved in arguments either with the American Consul or members of other government agencies, although he had cause to many times. As a result of this he was able to get valuable assistance from other Americans in the interests of OSS. Proof of his ability to get along with people and to do a job is evidenced by the fact that he has been offered a permanent position in the Career Foreign Service of the State Department by Mr. Davis, Director of Personnel (which # 306 will probably refuse), a job with USCCO as Assistant to Linton Wells in Angola and a commercial

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position with Frazer & Company of New York, as Angola and Mozambique Representative.

e. Unfortunately OSS had considerable difficulty with its Angola team. # 368 had been told that "a primary function was to assist these people in every way possible". This was done, even to the extent of considerable desk work. After a while # 368 was actually coordinating activities of the Angola team and cooperating with the British. Continued reports over a two year period will testify to the efficacy of this work, which included the taking over of Frazer & Company equipment and its disposal under good cover (with no help from the State Department) after the Frazer & Company Representatives had procrastinated over it for over a year.

f. Spot information, such as that on the Cabinda Company, was obtained without directives and only through our efforts was the State Department and other Government agencies able to obtain comprehensive and complete reports which otherwise would have never been available. The file on this company speaks for itself.

g. Work for USCCO made it possible to report clearly on the actual picture and the program of the USCCO in Angola. It also provided a real entree into government departments and private firms which ordinarily would have nothing to do with the Consulate.

h. Work as a Vice Consul gave us many opportunities to follow through on leads which the State Department did not feel were important enough to bother with. Time and again the several Consuls had to come to us for information requested of them by State which we had already sent in months previously. We had the pleasure of having State Department tell us that if it were not for our reports they would have little or nothing on

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file in Washington.

1. # 366 never had the serious transportation problems which seemed to confront other Americans in the Colony for the simple reason that he developed good contact with the personnel at the DELTA. As a result of close cooperation he was nearly always able to obtain plane space when needed without chartering planes and going to additional expense. The same held true with the steamship companies. His experience as Assistant Manager of a Trans-Atlantic Travel Agency proved to be of help.

j. # 366 was active in Boy's Work in Luanda as a result of his experience as a Scout Executive. Some of his best sources of information were associates in this work. They included the Judge of the Third Court, the Chief of the Public Instruction Services for Angola, The Archbishop and the Port Captain.

k. # 366 told his friends and associates that he was taking home leave only twenty-four hours prior to his departure. He paid informal visits to the following, among others:

1. Governor General of Angola who informed him that he had done much to bring about a better understanding between the Portuguese and Americans and that # 366 would be welcome in the Colony as a Vice Consul or in a Commercial Capacity if he desired to return. The only stipulation being that he return with his family. His Excellency said that a personal telegram sent to him in this respect would receive his immediate attention and that he would personally obtain a Lisbon clearance without additional delay.

2. Manuel Magro Romao, Chief of Police and the Secret Police, said that he would be welcome back into the colony and asked

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that he report unfavorably on IN back in Washington so that he would be recalled as IN was causing much misunderstanding between the Portuguese and Americans due to his lack of tact and doubtful objectives.

3. Major Jacinto do Nascimento Moura, dedicated a book to his "Illustrious friend, blah, blah," and wished him a speedy return.

4. The President and Vice President of the Export Junta wished him a speedy return and the latter presented him with an autographed copy of a book which he published in 1942, on the ~~Gorn~~ situation in Angola.

5. The Interim President of the Import Commission - a close and personal friend.

6. The Archbishop of Luanda, Dom Moyses de Pinho, wished him a pleasant trip and a speedy return.

7. And so on.

1. The present American Consul, who is by far the best of the lot kept telling # 368 that the Portuguese were anxious to get rid of him. Imagine his surprise when the Governor General sent down his Aide, the Archbishop his Secretary and other important officials came personally to bid your agent a fond farewell. To say nothing of a newspaper article, censored by the Governor's office, which was highly complimentary. Was the Consul's face red!

m. Before leaving # 368 was able to introduce his replacement to more than 70 of his personal friends who hold key positions in practically all governmental departments and many private concerns with head offices in

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Luanda. This was done on a personal basis and in a casual manner (the same thing had been previously done for other American personnel arriving in Luanda). These personal friends were the keys to much of the information which was sent on to OSS in Washington.

n. Completion of all intelligence reports requested in addition to full background reports on Colony.

8. CONDITIONS IN THE FIELD WHICH MIGHT BE IMPROVED:

a. Our biggest handicap to date has been the State Department. It feels that it, and it alone, is the chosen instrument of the American people to look out for U. S. interests abroad. It resents our efforts and while outwardly, at least, it seems to cooperate with us, a passive resistance is ever present which cuts down on our efficiency by gradually breaking down morale.

The letter of introduction recently drafted by the Africa Division which, in the future, will hopefully be sent out by the State Department to posts where our agents have been assigned should do much to remedy the situation which currently exists. I believe it to be a constructive step in the right direction.

On the other hand we must realize that the career personnel of the State Department will never change its attitude completely toward us. If we are to use State communication facilities we are the ones who must change if we want a modicum of efficiency from that which we actually have to work with. This means that all of our men going into the field must be properly indoctrinated as concerns State, i.e., be instructed to go along with Consular Office abroad no matter how much it costs because they hold the whip hand and because their prime use to us is as State Department communication

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facilities.

b. An agent, working in the field under cover does not consider his cover organization as the entity to whom he owes prime allegiance. If he is on the job he works for OSS all of the time and considers that his real mission. He has every right to expect that OSS take a keen interest in his problems for without the agent in the field the executive in Washington can have no intelligence to disseminate. Such being the case the man in the field is important and it is good personnel procedure to keep him happy by making him realize it.

A field agent has every right to expect that his desk man be one who has actually served in the field and knows the problems which exist there and what to do about them as they arise. When a letter is written in to the desk it is not for fun and the agent expects a comprehensive answer.

c. Civilian agents for OSS who have "won their spurs" on trying foreign assignments, doing exactly the same jobs and working out of the same office as are temporary officers of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps find it difficult to believe that commissions are not issued on a basis of merit and accomplishment in these United States of America. Why should some people get credit for military service while others doing identical work do not? Answer it as you will but the fact remains that the morale of the civilian agent suffers as a result.

d. An agent should be assigned a definite period for his foreign tour of duty. Once that period is up OSS should, of its own volition, arrange for his return home. Agent was in the field (on an original six month assignment) # 34. American Consul, had to return to the States on a Norwegian vessel. Travel orders for him had not been received in the American Consulate of London, and he had been requested of Washington

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by wire a month in advance.

e. Personal mail to and from Luanda constitutes a real problem. OSS would be of real service to the field man if it arranged for an APO number for him at Acora and arranged to have the mail sent on from there in the State Department Pouch.

f. An agent in the field, especially in the tropics, should get a thirty day leave at the end of six months so that he might recuperate in some nearby spot which is more healthful than his post. This would do much to boost his efficiency. Such leave should not be taken out of regular annual leave (you can hardly compare service in the tropics with that in the States, and therefore some adjustment, such as suggested, is not unreasonable).

g. A civil agent in the field is just as apt to contract a serious injury or illness as is his military co-workers, but it would seem that he is not eligible for identical treatment although both are doing exactly the same kind of work.

9. SPECIFIC DIFFICULTIES IN THE FIELD OF WHICH HE BECAME PERSONALLY AWARE:

a. Disgruntled American Consuls (hundreds of mean little acts which hampered efficiency). Example: # 366 helped to open up the Consulate, was American Vice Consul, yet he never received his commission nor was he officially presented to the Portuguese Government as such. These and others were difficulties which he had to overcome personally. Derogatory references to OSS work and personnel, time and again no assistance with cover problem (office space, etc.)

b. Constant friction between American Consuls and IN and other agencies in the Colony.

c. Attitude of poorly chosen American personnel toward the

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Portuguese brought about unfavorable reaction for U. S.

- d. Lack of knowledge of Portuguese language, a serious handicap in Angola for any agent.
- e. American business methods hard to understand, as are their representatives, by Portuguese.
- f. Lack of good medical and dental facilities. Malaria and dysentery common (4-500 thus attacked several times over a two year period).
- g. Lack of communication and transportation facilities within the colony, which cannot be totally solved with the use of an automobile.
- h. Complete isolation of Angola from other colonies (a handful of Americans residing in a territory approximately the size of Alaska).

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Acting Director
 FROM : Secretariat
 SUBJECT: Field Report of Maj. Madison P. Rehm

16,510
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 Field Report
 DATE: 29 MAY 1949
 X Rehm

1. Maj. Rehm visited all of the Communications installations in the India-Burma and China Theaters. He describes them all in detail and notes that the most successful way of obtaining a reliable source of portable power for good Communications in field operations seems to be a hand generator to operate the transmitter and a battery-operated receiver.

2. He reports no major difficulties.

Hoto
 W. B. Kantack
 ESC


W. B. Kantack
 W. B. Kantack
 Capt., A.C.
 Reports Officer

Attachment

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1949

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OSS Form 305A
(3908)
Director's Office

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

10,310
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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Office of the Director
VIA : Chief, Communications Branch
FROM : Major Madison P. Rehm *MPR*

DATE: 20 March 1945

SUBJECT: Report On Inspection Trip to India-Burma and China
Theaters

1. On instructions from the Chief of Communications Branch, I left Washington on 9 November 1944 and proceeded by air to Calcutta, India. I was to visit all of the Communications installations in the India-Burma and China Theaters and specifically was to check on the technical aspects of our communications problems. After carrying out my assignment, I returned to Washington on 12 February 1945.

2. In the India-Burma Theater I visited the Communications installations at Calcutta, Kandy, Trincomalee, Colombo, Nasira, Myitkyina, and Bhamo. In the China Theater, I visited Kunming. I also took several side trips to outlying field positions to interview and inspect directly some of our field positions. Since the main Communications Warehouse and Office was in Calcutta I made my headquarters there.

3. Calcutta

All Communications equipment sent to the Far East are shipped by plane or boat to Calcutta and immediately stocked in the Communications Warehouse. From there, on order from the various Detachments, it is routed by air or motor truck to its final destination. I made a thorough check from all equipment in stock and found that in general it was quite complete. Specific items such as small gasoline Generators, Battery Receivers, and certain spare parts were not available in large quantities, but before I left these items were arriving from the States in larger quantities.

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The radio Transmitters are located at Headquarters and are remotely controlled from the Receiver and Message Center location in the Communications compound. Schedules are kept with Kunming, Chittagong, Ceylon, and Naaira. These circuits all function properly and with a minimum of operating personnel.

4. Kandy

Since Kandy is the operational Headquarters of the OSS-SEAC set-up, this small station is quite busy handling administrative traffic. There is an intra island net between Kandy, Colombo, Galle and Trincomalee. Kandy also has circuits to Calcutta, Kunming, and to Arakan.

5. Colombo

The complete Transmitter and Receiver Station at Colombo is located in OSS Headquarters. This station functions in the intra island net to send necessary traffic to Kandy. There is normally only one operator and one code clerk on duty.

I did not visit the Galle Station as the Maritime Unit Training Center had been practically abandoned and very little traffic was handled from there.

6. Trincomalee

The Station at Trincomalee handles all of the operational intelligence traffic for Detachment 404. The Transmitter station is located outside of the city and is part of the complete OSS Training Camp. There are six Transmitters ranging from 300 Watts to 1 Kilowatt in power with appropriate rhombic antennas. The Receiver location is 3 miles north of the main Camp area and the Transmitter are remotely controlled from that

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point. This receiver location was just being completed and will give adequate facilities in handling operational traffic. Several circuits were being worked consistently with South Burma, Thailand, and French Indo-China over distances up to 1500 miles.

The Radio Code Training School is part of the set-up at Trincomalee and all of the equipment that is sent to the field with agents, is tested there and prepared for shipment. Some Underwater Sound Communications equipment has been made available there for use of the Maritime units.

7. Ceylon

Under the leadership of Major Charles Compton, the Communications installations on Ceylon are in very good shape. No warehousing of large Communications equipment is done there because supplies can be sent from Calcutta on short order. The morale of the men is quite good.

8. Nazira

Nazira is the Headquarters for Detachment 101 and most of the Communications equipment is supplied to the field from this point. This is also the Training Center and several small schools for radio communication are still in existence. I visited several of these Camps and watched the training operations. Certain parts of some of the field stations are still being built at Nazira, since many of the agents have been in the field for a long period and when new equipment is required they must have the same type of apparatus. The SSIR-1 is being used by the new field parties going out.

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It may be of interest to note that I spent several hours visiting the hospital which has been set-up by Comdr. Luce and his Staff. He has a very fine group of personnel and equipment and is doing a splendid job of rehabilitating both our own people and the natives. It was definitely one of the high lights of my journey.

9. Myitkyina

Myitkyina was the field headquarters for Detachment 101 and the Communications equipment was set-up near the rest of the OSS installations. The Transmitting Site was located about one mile away and consisted of several Transmitters in a mobile radio truck. The security of the Message Center was not too good because it was located in a simple Basha. However, there was always someone on duty and no trouble occurred. I took a trip to Bhamo to inspect the forward position and the move from Myitkyina was made soon after I left. At Bhamo, the series of Bashes which were taken over for our work were on stilts and away from the rest of the community. Later reports showed that the installation was operating very successfully in that location and the security was good.

10. Kunming

In that China Theater, the only installation that I visited was at Kunming. Just previous to my visit, the Transmitting and Receiving location was about 8 miles out of the city on the other side of the airport. Messages were relayed into the Message Center by teletype over very poor telephone lines causing much delay. While I was in Kunming, the new Receiving station was open. This is located several

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hundred yards down the road from the OSS compound on Signal Corps property. The Signal Corps has been very cooperative and are allowing us to use their Rhombic Antennas for receiving which saves us much time and material. The Transmitting Center is a complete Communications compound located about 2 miles from the Receiving location. This compound contained the large Warehouse, Transmitter building, Generator building, and quarters for maintenance and operating personnel. The antenna systems were located outside of the compound proper on wooden poles laid out and set by the Signal Corps. Since returning, I have been informed that these stations are now in full operation. With the equipment installed, it should be possible to expand our facilities to handle much more traffic.

11. General

Lt. Colonel Frank Falknor who was our Communications Chief for the India-Burma and China Theaters has done a masterful job in setting up a complete Warehousing and Supply system, as well as establishing the necessary Communications bases and sub-bases for field activities. He has established a very favorable liaison with the Signal Corps so that he was able to draw radio supplies direct from that organization. All of this was done with a very limited amount of personnel.

I took along with me an SST-103, which is a new type of 50 Watt Amplifier to be used in conjunction with the SSTR-1. This type of unit had been requested particularly by Major Compton's Group for field operations and approximately seven weeks after the request was received, we had designed and had manufactured 10 of these units. The first one

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went with me and others were shipped by air. I helped to install this unit at Cox's Bazaar as the first field station in the Arakan show. Since that time, more of these have been produced and sent to the Theater for use.

I also took along a new small Battery Receiver Type SSR-5-A. This was an improved model of one which had already been supplied in small quantities to the Theater. It was immediately sent out into the field in South Burma for test and preliminary reports showed that it was working out very satisfactorily. Since that time, these Receivers are being shipped and air pouched and many of them are in operation at present.

In all Theaters, the main handicap to good Communications in field operations is a lack of reliable source of portable power. Batteries are very hard to procure and at the same time have a very short life especially, for transmitting. The portable Hand Generator can be used where the circuit will run for hours, but it is impossible to have enough men to keep cranking the Generator. Small gasoline driven Generators have been supplied in limited quantities, but there again it is a matter of training the natives and obtaining sufficient gasoline to maintain the engine. The most successful combination in the Far East seems to be a Hand Generator to operate the Transmitter and a battery operated Receiver. The SSIR-1 Transmitter unit and the GH-45 Generator plus the SSR-5-A and a Battery Pack has been used successfully. The sources of Batteries in the India-Burma and China Theaters are two in number namely, the Signal Corps and the National Carbon who make a limited amount of batteries at their factory in Calcutta.

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However, the field life in these humid weather conditions is very short. An improved dry Battery consisting of "mercury" cells is now in production by the Signal Corps and will be used as soon as it is available.

Very high frequency equipment is just being installed on combat and operational planes in these Theaters and several different types of equipment are available in our Calcutta Warehouse whenever we are ready to use our own planes.

There are no major difficulties being encountered in these Theaters by the Communications Branch at present. The humid climate and high temperatures is one of our worst enemies both on equipment and personnel. At the present time, several means of waterproofing equipment is available and we are now working toward making each unit completely submersion proofed.



Madison P. Rehm
Major, Sig C
Chief, Plant & Engineering
Division
Communications Branch

Field Report

30 March 1946

Office of the Director
Chief, Communications Branch
Major William P. Tobin
Report On Inspection Trip to India-Burma and China
Theater

1. On instructions from the Chief of Communications Branch, I left Washington on 9 November 1944 and proceeded by air to Calcutta, India. I was to visit all of the Communications installations in the India-Burma and China Theaters and specifically was to check on the technical aspects of our communications problems. After carrying out my assignment, I returned to Washington on 18 February 1946.

2. In the India-Burma Theater I visited the Communications installations at Calcutta, Kandy, Trincomalee, Colombo, Madras, Myittha, and Rangoon. In the China Theater, I visited Kuning. I also took several side trips to outlying field positions to interview and inspect directly some of our field positions. Since the main Communications Warehouse and Office was in Calcutta I made my headquarters there.

3. Calcutta

All Communications equipment sent to the Far East are shipped by plane or boat to Calcutta and immediately stocked in the Communications Warehouse. From there, on order from the various Headquarters, it is moved by air or motor truck to the final destination. I made a thorough check from all equipment in stock and found that in general it was quite complete. Specific items such as small gasoline generators, battery chargers, and certain spare parts were not available in large quantities, but before I left these items were arriving from the States in larger quantities.

The station at Trincomalee handles all of the operational traffic. The transmitter for Detachment 404. The transmitter station is located outside of the city and is part of the complete OGB Training Camp. There are six transmitters ranging from 500 Watts to 1 kilowatt in power with appropriate rhombic antennas. The Receiver location is 2 miles north of the main Camp area and the transmitter are remotely controlled from that

6. Trincomalee

from there. Center had been practically abandoned and very little traffic was handled I did not visit the radio station as the Maritime Unit Training and one code clerk on duty. not to send necessary traffic to Kandy. There is normally only one operator located in OGB Headquarters. This station functions in the island The complete transmitter and Receiver station at Colombo is

8. Colombo

also has circuits to Colombo, Kandy, and to Arakan. In an intra island net between Kandy, Colombo, Galle and Trincomalee. Kandy this small station is quite busy handling administrative traffic. There since Kandy is the operational Headquarters of the OGB-EMO set-up.

6. Kandy

of operating personnel. Galle, and Matara. These circuits all function properly and with a minimum communications compound. Schedules are kept with Kandy, Chittagong. remotely controlled from the Receiver and Message Center location in the The radio transmitters are located at Headquarters and are

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the new field parties going out. They must have the same type of equipment. The result is being used in the field for a long period and when new equipment is required stations are still being built at Hanoi, other parts of the country have watched the training operations. Certain parts of some of the stations are still in existence. I visited several of these camps and is also the Training Center and several small schools for radio communications equipment is supplied to the field from this point. This Hanoi is the Headquarters for Detachment 101 and most of the

6. Hanoi

Food. sent from Calcutta on short order. The morale of the men is quite large communications equipment is done there because supplies can be installations on Ceylon are in very good shape. No working of Under the leadership of Major Charles Campbell, the communications

7. Ceylon

of the Maritime units. Ground communications equipment has been made available there for use agents, is tested there and prepared for shipment. Some Headquarters Trincomalee and all of the equipment that is sent to the field with The Radio Code Training School is part of the set-up at Indo-China over distances up to 1800 miles. were being worked constantly with South Korea, Thailand, and French adequate facilities in handling operational traffic. Several electronic points. This receiver location was just being completed and will give

SECRET

LEADERS

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Mythology and the Field Researchers for Document 101

It may be of interest to note that I spent several hours visiting the hospital which has been set-up by Omdur. There are 150 staff. He has a very fine group of personnel and equipment and is doing a splendid job of rehabilitating both our own people and the natives. It was definitely one of the high lights of my journey.

we had designed and had manufactured 10 of these units. The first one
operations and approximately seven weeks after the request was received,
had been requested particularly by Major General's Group for the
amplifier to be used in conjunction with the R-100. This type of unit
I took along with me on R-100, which is a new type of 50 watt
at this was done with a very limited amount of personnel.
he was able to draw radio supplies direct from the organization. All
has established a very favorable liaison with the Signal Corps so that
necessary communications have and sub-base for field activities. He
up a complete warehousing and supply system, as well as establishing the
the India-Burma and China Theaters has done a masterful job in setting
Lt. Colonel Frank Palmer who was our Communications Chief for

11. General

handle much more traffic.
equipment installed, it should be possible to expand our facilities to
been informed that these stations are now in full operation. With the
piles laid out and set by the Signal Corps. Since beginning, I have
antenna systems were located outside of the compound proper in wooden
building, and quarters for maintenance and operating personnel. The
compound contained the large warehouse, transmitter building, generator
compound located about 2 miles from the housing location. This
time and material. The transmitting center is a complete communications
us to use their portable antennas for receiving which saves us much
property. The Signal Corps has been very cooperative and are allowing
hundred yards down the road from the old compound on Signal Corps

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These are two in number usually, the Signal Corps and the Engineer
 usually. The source of battery in the India-Burma and China
 the old generator plus the 15-A and a battery pack has been used
 and a battery operated generator. The 15-A generator unit and
 in the far East seems to be a hand-cranked generator to operate the transmitter
 gasoline to maintain the engine. The most successful combination
 again is in a matter of training the natives and obtaining sufficient
 driven generators have been supplied in limited quantities, but there
 to have enough men to keep cranking the generator. Small gasoline
 can be used where the electric will run 12 hours, but it is impossible
 short life expectancy, for transmitting. The portable hand generator
 batteries are very hard to procure and at the same time have a very
 in field operations is a lack of reliable source of portable power.
 In all theaters, the main handicap to good communications
 present.
 being shipped and air powered and many of them are in operation at
 working are very satisfactory. Hence that time, these generators are
 field in South Burma for test and preliminary reports showed that to use
 small quantities to the theater. It was immediately sent and into the
 This was an improved model of one which had already been supplied in
 I also took along a new small battery generator type 15-A.
 to the theater for use.
 show. Hence that time, more of these have been produced and sent
 this unit at Gen's Bureau as the first field station in the Burma
 went with me and others were shipped by air. I helped to install

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21012

completely submergence proofed.
 equipment is available and we are now working toward making such units
 and personnel. At the present time, several means of waterproofing
 and high temperatures is one of our worst enemies both in equipment
 theaters by the Communications Branch at present. The hand elements
 There are no major difficulties being encountered in these
 we are ready to use our own planes.
 types of equipment are available in our Calcutta Harbours wherever
 combat and operational planes in these theaters and several different
 Very high frequency equipment is just being installed on
 by the signal Corps and will be used as soon as it is available.
 An improved dry battery consisting of "merry" cells is now in production
 However, the field life in these hard weather conditions is very short.

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